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1.1 The Research Problem 
 Executive compensation has been a subject of interest over the past decade.    This 
interest might be attributable to the instances of executive overcompensation as defined 
in the media.  The focus on executive compensation began with accounting scandals at 
WorldCom, Tyco, Enron, HealthSouth, and has not abated due to problems at 
Countrywide Mortgage, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and many 
others.  In the most recent financial crisis, top executives have either resigned or been 
terminated, only to walk away with millions of dollars from executive severance 
packages. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) found the mean compensation for CEOs 
increased from $3.7 million in 1993 to $9.1 million in 2003, peaking at $17.4 million in 
2000, representing an overall increase of 146%.  They found the compensation for the top 
five firm executives increased from $9.5 million in 1993 to $21.5 million in 2003, 
peaking at $36.6 in 2000. This represents an increase of 126%.  Controlling for firm 
growth and performance, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find evidence suggesting that 




what can be explained by or attributed to firm growth and performance.  It should be 
noted, that since firms are not required to disclose executive pension plans or deferred 
compensation, the actual growth of compensation is probably understated.   
Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) examine top management employment 
agreements for CEO’s at S&P 500 firms.  They find that over one-half of the employment 
agreements between a CEO and their respective firm are implicit employment 
agreements.  They develop a model to predict whether the employment agreement 
between the CEO and the firm will be implicit or explicit
1
.  Their study provides insight 
into the factors that lead to the utilization of implicit or explicit contracts.  One problem 
with their study is that it does not address the question: How does the structure of an 
employment agreement align the objectives of the firm’s managers and owners? 
Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) examine the history of executive 
remuneration, where it is now, what are the problems with current remuneration policies, 
and how to fix them.  Their study identifies three critical dimensions that should exist in 
any remuneration policy in order to motivate executives to take actions that will create 
and sustain long-run shareholder value.  These are (1) the total benefits associated with 
the job or position including the costs and benefits of non-pecuniary aspects of the job, 
(2) the composition of the remuneration package, and (3) the relation between pay and 
performance.  Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck provide insight into some of the important 
                                                 
1
 Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) define an explicit employment agreement as a comprehensive written 
contract between a firm and their CEO, establishing the terms of their relationship including determining 
the CEO’s responsibilities, compensation, perquisites, term of employment, the conditions under which 
either party can sever the relationship, and restrictions on the CEO’s outside activities, among other 
considerations.  An implicit employment agreement is defined as a contract having no written agreement, 
or a contract covering only limited aspects of a firm’s relationship with their CEO, such as change of 




characteristics of an employment agreement between a firm and top management.  This 
study does not test empirically these three critical dimensions. 
The market for NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision head coaches is a market where 
there is competition for top management, similar to that of the market for top corporate 
management.
2
  Additionally, this is a market where all top management has explicit 
contracts.  This presents an opportunity to examine empirically the first two critical 
dimensions mentioned by Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004).  The objective of this 
study is to examine the compensation of the heads of athletic management to help 
increase the body of knowledge on compensation of top corporate managers.   
Similar to the public outcry and growth that we have witnessed in top corporate 
CEO compensation, we have also witnessed an outcry regarding NCAA Football Bowl 
Subdivision head coaches.  The USA Today reported that, “across the NCAA's Division 
I-A (now called the Football Bowl Subdivision or FBS), the number of million-dollar 
coaches has soared from five in 1999 to 50 today. It's sure to continue climbing in 
2008.”
3
  In fact, it has continued to climb as the number of coaches making over a million 
dollars has now ascended to 65 out of the 120 FBS coaches.
4
  An article titled “Programs 
Struggle to Balance Budgets,” by the popular sports media source, ESPN, cited William 
Kirwan, the chancellor of the University System of Maryland and co-chairman of the 
Knight Commission of Intercollegiate Athletics, as stating "In a lot of ways, I see 
                                                 
2
 NCAA is the National Collegiate Athletic Association.  They are the governing body for all collegiate 
athletic programs. 
3
 As reported by USA Today.  To read the full article entitled “Contracts for College Coaches Cover More 
than Salary” go to http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2006-11-16-coaches-salaries-
cover_x.htm. 
4





parallels between the implosion of our economy and the excessive spending in college 
athletics.  There was an assumption that housing prices would always go up and up. You 
could buy a house and everybody assumed its value would increase.  Intercollegiate 
athletics has lived in this fantasy world and assumed corporate sponsorships and TV 
contracts would always go up.  Now we're finding out that's not the case. I think we've 
dug ourselves a huge hole."  Kirwan continues, "There was such an outrage about what 
corporate CEOs were making and now people are looking at what coaches are making 
compared to other university personnel, and I think there's the same concern," Kirwan 
further states, "I think it's an outrageous situation. I think coaching salaries are certainly 
the driver of the excessive spending in athletics, but the arms race with facilities has been 
a huge contributor, too."
5
 
In their 2006-2007 Annual Report on the Economic Status of the Profession, 
titled, “Financial Inequality in Higher Education,” the American Association of 
University Professors, states, “If paychecks reflect the value of an individual to the 
university and its core educational mission, then Division I-A head football coaches are, 
on average, 9.4 times more valuable than their full professor colleagues.  By this metric, 
the head football coach at the University of Oklahoma is 36 times more valuable than an 
average full professor at his university.  The data suggest that even university presidents 
are less valuable to these institutions than football coaches.  On average, coaches earned 
more than twice as much as their institution’s chief executive officer.”  “The University 
                                                 
5
 As reported by ESPN.go.com.  The full article entitled “Programs Struggle to Balance Budget” written by 





of Oklahoma apparently values its football coach eleven times as much as its president.”
6
  
This study indicates that the highest maximum annual compensation for a NCAA FBS 
head coach was in 2009, when the University of Texas’ head football coach Mack Brown 
had the potential to make $4.63 million dollars.  While this pails in contrast to executive 
compensation, the growth rate in both top corporate executive salaries NCAA FBS head 
coaches is somewhat similar.
7
   
Corporate executive and football coach labor markets have a number of additional 
similarities.  Pat Forde, a journalist for ESPN observed, “Most revenue-sport coaches at 
the top of the college food chain are accustomed to living like CEO’s.  In fact, many 
believe that projecting a “we-do-everything-first-class” aura (private jets, huge offices, 
state-of-the-art facilities, etc.) is an important recruiting tool.”
8
  Head football coaches 
receive numerous non-performance based perquisites similar to those received by top 
corporate managers, such as country club memberships, automobiles for personal use, 
and even personal use of personal aircraft paid for by the university.  Additionally, 
analogous to top corporate executives, coaches that get terminated before the end of the 
term of their employment agreement without just cause (poor performance), often get 
paid hefty severance packages (i.e., golden parachutes) by the university.  The previously 
mentioned USA Today article reports that when Michigan State University fired John L. 
                                                 
6
 As reported by AAUP.  The full 2006-07 annual report can be found at 
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/B25BFE69-BCE7-4AC9-A644-7E84FF14B883/0/zreport.pdf.  
7
 Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) found that mean compensation for CEO’s has increased from $3.7 million 
in 1993 to $9.1 million in 2003, representing an overall increase of 146% or an annual growth rate of 
8.52%.  Similarly, this study finds that mean compensation for NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision head 
coaches has increased from $891,806 in 2003 to $1,602,019 in 2009, representing an overall increase of 




 As reported by ESPN.go.com.  The full article entitled “Big-money Coaches  Not Immune” written by 





Smith in 2006, they paid him $4.3 million to buy out the two remaining years of his 
contract
9
.  In another article published by NBC Sports upon Notre Dame’s firing of 
Charlie Weis at the end of the 2009 season, Notre Dame will be left on the hook for a 
speculated $18 million dollars to buy out the remaining six years of his contract.
10
   
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine head football coaching employment 
agreements for the NCAA FBS to determine the market for top management in athletics 
as well as gain further insight to relationships of top executive compensation in corporate 
firms.   
1.3 Structure of the Research 
Chapter 2 discusses the seminal literature on compensation, contracts, and pay for 
performance.   
Chapter 3 describes the NCAA Football Bowl Division head coach’s employment 
agreements.  More specifically Chapter 3 presents the data assembled from the various 
employment agreements.  This data includes both the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary 
aspects of the employment agreements, university characteristics, and coach’s 
characteristics.  Chapter 3 also presents the summary statistics for the data variables.  
                                                 
9
 As reported by USA Today.  To read the full article entitled “Contracts for College Coaches Cover More 
than Salary” go to http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2006-11-16-coaches-salaries-
cover_x.htm. 
10
 As reported by NBCSports.  To read the full article entitled “Swarbrick talk’s buyout and coaching 




Chapter 4 designates both univariate and multivariate models used to determine 
the total maximum compensation, and the composition or structure of the employment 
agreement (guaranteed pay versus performance pay).  Chapter 4 also presents the results 
of these models and discusses their implications. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this study and its potential implications to 
the market for FBS football head coaches as well as any potential implications that can be 







REVIEW OF COMPENSATION AND PAY FOR PERFORMANCE LITERATURE 
 This chapter reviews the literature on executive compensation and is divided into 
two main sections.  The first section discusses literature on executive compensation and 
the second section covers pay for performance literature.   
2.1 Compensation Literature 
 The literature involving executive compensation is extensive.  Numerous reviews 
of this literature have already been done with the best being Murphy (1998), Core, Guay, 
and Larcker (2001), and Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004).  Murphy (1998) states 
“There has been an explosion in academic research on executive compensation.  CEO 
pay research has grown even faster than CEO paychecks, skyrocketing from 1-2 papers 
per year in 1985 to sixty papers in 1995.”  It did not tail off from that point either.    Most 
of these literature surveys begin with a discussion of seminal papers such as Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) study on agency costs.  Many compensation studies begin citing 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) because the chief goal of compensation agreements is to 
create incentives that motivate agents (managers) to align their goals with principals 
(owners or stockholders).  A compensation agreement providing the agent with 
guaranteed compensation may lead to inefficiencies and overall poor performance, to the 
detriment of the principal.  On the other hand, a compensation agreement providing only 
performance incentives may entice the principal to manipulate earnings, revenues, or any 




 Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) attempt to determine the compensation 
practices that will minimize the agency problem they examine the history of executive 
compensation, the current executive compensation practices, the potential problems with 
the current compensation policies, and ways to fix the problems with current 
compensation policies.  One particular problem they discuss is overvalued equity and its 
role in recent corporate scandals.  Overvalued equity occurs when managers manipulate 
earnings or utilize other unethical means to inflate the market price of the firm’s equity.  
This problem, they argue, stems from the performance based compensation that awards 
stocks and options to top executives.  This method of performance based compensation 
has largely been viewed as a method to align the motivation of managers to the 
motivations of shareholders.  As executives increase the market price of the firm’s 
common stock, the wealth of these executives, increases.  When executives have 
performance based compensation, there is a tendency to push the market price of the 
stock as high as legally possible.  Executives in overvalued firms eventually realize they 
cannot generate the earnings necessary to support the overvalued stock price.  In order to 
continue increasing the market value and meet market expectation, executives use the 
firm’s high market value to make acquisitions.  These acquisitions may or may not add 
economic value that maximizes shareholder wealth.  They may have been done to satisfy 
growth expectations.  Furthermore, executives may also be inclined to increase the 
aggressiveness of their accounting and operating decisions, to shift future revenues to 
present revenues and present expenses to future expenses.  This often leads to further 
manipulation and eventually to fraud.  Jensen, Murphy and Wruck point out that 




increase agency problems. They state that the only way to alleviate this problem is 
through increased governance systems.   
Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) further discuss the relationship between 
managers, analysts, and the capital market.  They examine the incentives offered to the 
firm’s managers to meet or beat analyst forecasts.  They find the incentives erode the 
integrity of the firm.  In fact, Healy (1985) indicates that bonus incentives are only 
effective in aligning managers’ interests with the interests of shareholders when they are 
close to meeting bonus criteria.  When managers are above their bonus target they have 
an incentive to be unproductive, shirk or even push potential earnings and sales to the 
next bonus period in order to help them achieve their future bonus target.  This behavior 
is also evident for managers who have given up on achieving the current bonus target.  
They will again have an incentive to be unproductive, shirk or push potential earnings 
and sales to the next bonus period making it less likely they will receive a bonus in the 
current period, but more likely they will meet the future bonus target.   
Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) list 37 recommendations and guiding 
principles that should be included in an effective executive compensation package.  
Additionally, they identify the three critical dimensions of a compensation policy needed 
to motivate executives to take actions which will create and sustain long-run shareholder 
value.  They are (1) the total benefits associated with the job or position including the 
costs and benefits of non-pecuniary aspects of the job, (2) the composition of the 




Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) empirically test many aspects of CEO 
employment agreements.  They find over one-half of the employment agreements 
between a CEO and the firm are implicit in nature, meaning there are no written or 
documented compensation packages.  They find the chance there will be an explicit 
contract increases in firms where the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and 
where the expected loss to the CEO is greater.  They focus mostly on the circumstances 
under which a firm and a CEO would choose to have an explicit contract vs. an implicit 
contract.  However, given their finding indicating less than one-half have written 
employment agreements presents a problem, in that any study utilizing CEO contracts 
may be biased toward the type of firms employing explicit contracts.      
2.2  Contracts and Pay for Performance 
Scully (1974) is one of the first to examine pay versus performance utilizing 
Major League Baseball (MLB) player salaries and performance statistics.  More 
specifically he determines whether there is an economic loss to MLB players due to the 
instigation of a reserve clause.  In sports, the reserve clause is a restriction on a player’s 
ability to negotiate with any team, other than the team owning the player’s contract.  The 
owner of the contract, however, is not free to simply reduce the compensation paid to a 
player, but negotiations are restricted between the two parties, thus restricting a player’s 
ability to maximize his value on the open labor market.  Under the reserve clause rules 
the only way a player can leave for another team is if the owner decides to either 
terminate the contract, in which case the player is free to negotiate with any other team, 




whether there is truly an economic loss to the player based on the reserve clause, Scully 
estimates the salary function as well as the marginal revenue products of the factors of 
production for each individual.  A comparison of the salary estimate and the marginal 
revenue product over various career lengths and performance levels are examined.  The 
difference is determined to be the rate of monopolistic exploitation of the player by the 
owner due to the reserve clause.  The results of his study show the reserve clause led to 
economic exploitation of MLB players, more specifically average players earned only 
20% of their marginal contribution to team revenue and the star players earned only 15% 
of their marginal contribution to team revenue.  “Scully’s model has become a 
benchmark for analyzing the effects of new contractual frameworks on a player’s salary.” 
(Antonietti 2006). 
In 1975, one year after Scully’s 1974 study, a court decision rescinded the reserve 
clause thus giving MLB players the right to become free agents.   This enabled a MLB 
player at the end of his contract to negotiate with any team in the open market.  Sommers 
and Quinton (1982) expanded Scully’s model to account for this feature.  Results of their 
study showed upon the rescension of the reserve clause, the salary paid to MLB free 
agent players was consistent with their marginal revenue product.   
Scott, Long and Somppi (1985) again utilize the model developed by Scully 
(1974), this time to analyze National Basketball Association (NBA) player salaries.  They 
find, in a market where players are free to sign with the team offering the most 
competitive salary, such as was the case for NBA players, salaries were consistent with 




performance in the National Hockey League (NHL).  Utilizing Scully’s (1974) model, 
they provide evidence that in the NHL player’s salaries are also in line with their 
marginal contribution to team revenues.  Thus, these players are not exploited.  
Additionally, they add a variable to Scully’s 1974 model to account for ethnicity, more 
specifically to determine if French Canadians are discriminated against in the NHL.  
They find French Canadian players are not exploited and their salary is not significantly 
different than other players.  Jones and Walsh also find evidence that the performance 
characteristics included in their model were all significant, further indicating performance 
is rewarded through a player’s salary.    
Lucifora and Simmons (2003) utilize the market for professional soccer players in 
the Italian major leagues to determine whether there is a superstar effect.  In other words, 
is there a convex relationship in the salary structure, due to performance, of professional 
soccer players after controlling for personal attributes and team characteristics?  They 
find evidence to support the existence of a superstar effect in the Italian soccer league.   
Shmanske (2000) examines pay versus performance in golf, a sport featuring an 
individual performance, not team performance.  Shamanske breaks down golf into four 
skill categories.  He then regresses earnings per tournament on the skill categories and 
finds significant evidence that golfers are rewarded based on the performance of two of 
the four skills, putting and driving distance.  He further examines both the Professional 
Golfers’ Association (PGA) and Lady’s Professional Golfers’ Association (LPGA) 
together and finds there is not sufficient evidence to suggest discrimination of rewards 




compared to the PGA but are proportionate to the level of skill when combining the 
golfers of the two tours.   
Clayton and Yermack (2001) utilize MLB player contracts to examine the use of 
real options within these contracts.  They find real options having a significant effect on 
MLB player contracts.  More specifically, players receive a higher compensation when 
the team has an option on future services and lower salaries when the player has an 
option to extend their contracts.  Clayton and Yermack (2001) are only able to look at 
one type of real option, the option to extend a player’s contract.     
Stiroh (2007) analyzes contract related incentive effects for NBA players.  More 
specifically, he examines NBA player contracts to determine if there is an incentive for 
players to improve performance in the year before they sign a multi-year contract.  He 
finds there is a significant increase in player performance in the year prior to signing a 
multiyear contract, and there is a significant decrease in player performance in the year 
following the signing of a multiyear contract.  Additionally, teams with more players in 
the final year of their contract significantly outperform (increase wins), but performance 
again falls when those players sign multiyear contracts. 
Other studies focusing on individual incentives include Lazear (2000), Paarsch 
and Shearer (2000), and Shearer (2004), who study changes in firm wide compensation 
plans.  The empirical literature on executive pay and performance includes Murphy 
(1985, 1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Kaplan (1994), 






 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the governing body for 
all collegiate sports across the nation.  In 1973, the NCAA’s membership was divided 
into three legislative and competitive divisions, Division I, Division II and Division III.  
Five years later, Division I members voted to create subdivisions I-A and I-AA.    On 
December 15, 2006 the previously mentioned subdivisions were renamed to become the 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS). 
This subdivision distinction is only relevant to collegiate football programs.  In 2009, 
there were 120 NCAA FBS programs.  This number increased from 119 with Western 
Kentucky University becoming a member of the FBS, the highest division in college 
football.
11
   
 For purposes of this study, contract and university information for 120 of the 
NCAA Football Bowl Division programs over the period 2003-2009 is collected
12
.  This 
yielded 834 university observations over the seven year period of time.  Of the 120 
NCAA Football Bowl Division programs, contract information cannot be obtained for the 
private universities which account for 20 of the NCAA Football Bowl Division programs, 
leaving 694 possible contracts.  In addition to the private universities, the University of 
Oregon and Oregon State University cite copyright infringement laws precluding the 
                                                 
11
 A complete history of the NCAA and the Football Division can be found at 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354 
12
 The University of Western Kentucky was added in 2009 leading to 120 total NCAA Football Bowl 
Division universities.  Prior to 2009 there were only 119 NCAA Football Bowl Division universities.  This 




sharing of their contracts with the public.  Northern Illinois, Pennsylvania State 
University, the University of Pennsylvania, University of Akron, and Temple University 
have not released their contracts also citing privacy laws, leaving 645 possible contract 
years.  Of the remaining years, response rates from various other institutions lead to 126 
incomplete or missing contract years.  The final data set contains 519 NCAA Football 
Bowl Division university observations for the period 2003-2009.  
3.1 Description of Data 
  Table 1 contains the descriptions for the variables contained in this data set. 
Variables are segregated into three categories: Coach Characteristics, University 
Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics.  University Characteristics are further 
divided into three subcategories: General, Game Performance, and Recruiting 
Performance.  Contract Characteristics are further broken down into Salary Information, 
Performance Based Incentives, Non-Performance Based Incentives, and Termination and 
Buyout Clauses. 
3.1.1 Coach Characteristics 
 Coach characteristics consist of variables providing a description of the coach.  
Variables such as age, race, career performance, university performance, the coach’s 
reason for leaving previous place of employment are reported.   
Collection of race variables comes from searching individual university websites 
and visually observing the race of each head football coach.  Age, coaching tenure, 




from one of three web sources: NCAA Coach/Student-Athlete Look-up, Coaches Hot 
Seat, and the College Football Data Warehouse.
13
  Career winning percentage and 
university winning percentage are calculated by dividing games won by total games 
coached.  Length of contract, contract beginning dates and contract ending dates are 
collected from university employment agreements for NCAA Football Bowl Division 
universities.  Information concerning the coach’s previous employment is collected from 
various internet sources, including university websites, coach’s personal websites and 
from Wikipedia.  In cases where the primary source of information is Wikipedia, the 
information is verified with at least one additional source.   
3.1.2 University Characteristics 
 University characteristics include variables describing various aspects of the 
university.  These variables are further broken into three subcategories: general, game 
performance, and recruiting performance.   
The NCAA FBS is divided into 11 conferences.  Conference affiliation contains a 
large amount of information.  To control for this dummy variables are included for each 
conference.  General university characteristics are also included.  These general 
university characteristics consist of the university’s endowment, revenues, and stadium 
capacity.  These variables not only capture information on the size of the university, but 
                                                 
13
 The NCAA Coach/Student-Athlete Look-up database found at, www.ncaa.org , Coaches Hot Seat is a 
subscription based website that concentrates on NCAA Division 1-A Basketball coaches and NCAA 
Football Division coaches.  They collect news and information, including salary information, for all NCAA 
Football Bowl Division head coaches.  This website can be found at www.coacheshotseat.com.  College 
Football Data Warehouse is a website that has compiled numerous databases on both current and past 
college head football coaches.  This website can be found and accessed without subscription at 




they also capture the popularity or potential market size of a university’s football 
program.  Stadium capacity information is collected from the College Football Data 
Warehouse.  Endowment information is collected from National Association of College 
and University Business Officers Annual Endowment Study.
14
  University football 
revenues are collected from U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics 
Database.
15
   
Information about succession events surrounding the university’s previous head 
coach are also contained in this section.  Succession information is collected from 
searches of various internet sources, including university websites, coach’s personal 
websites and from Wikipedia.  As previously mentioned, data collected from Wikipedia, 
is verified with at least one additional source.   
3.1.2.1 University Characteristics: Game Performance 
Game Performance variables include university win and loss record, average 
attendance, and average attendance as a percent of stadium capacity.  Average attendance 
is collected from attendance reports submitted by the universities to the NCAA.
16
  
Average attendance as a percent of stadium capacity is calculated as average attendance 
divided by stadium capacity.  University win/loss record for the current year and the 
previous year are collected from the College Football Data Warehouse or the NCAA.   
 
                                                 
14
 The National Association of College and University Business Officers Annual Endowment Study can be 
found at www.nacubo.org.  
15
 The U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics Database can be found at 
http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/Index.aspx.  
16




3.1.2.2 University Characteristics: Recruiting Performance 
Recruiting performance variables are collected through a popular online scouting 
and recruiting service called Rivals
17
.  Each year Rivals indicates by university their 
recruiting performance using three different indicators: average stars, points, and overall 
rank.   
Rivals rates each individual football recruit giving them a rating based on talent 
level, with one star being the lowest and five stars being the highest.  A university’s 
recruiting class is calculated as the average stars received by each individual recruit. 
Rivals developed a unique and proprietary formula allocating points based on 
different recruiting criteria.
18
  These points are the basis for Rivals rankings.  Rivals ranks 
the university recruiting on the number of points the program received from its recruiting 
commitments with 1 being the highest rank.  Points and rank information are collected 
and utilized in this essay due to the difference in the measures.  Total recruiting points 
contain more information than rank, because points can measure the degree of difference 
between two closely ranked teams.  For example, teams ranked fourth and fifth may have 
a difference in points of 25, whereas teams ranked sixth and seventh may have a 
difference in points of 100.  From the measure of points you can see the fourth and fifth 
ranked teams are closer in recruiting performance then the sixth and seventh ranked 
teams. 
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 Utilizing information from Rivals is consistent with previous recruiting studies and follows that of 
Dumond, Lynch, and Platania (2008). 
18
 Teams are awarded points through a formula that rewards them for both the quantity of commitments and 
the quality of those players. Prospects with higher star ratings earn more points for the school to which they 
commit; prospects that are ranked among the top at their positions earn still more points; and prospects that 




The length of impact an individual or the entire recruiting class has on a team 
must also be considered but can be difficult to ascertain.  An individual recruit typically 
has four years of eligibility (two years for junior college recruits).  Therefore, individual 
recruits will have an impact on a team for much longer than the year in which he was 
recruited.  This necessitates collecting recruiting results for up to four prior years for each 
observation.  However, recruits do not necessarily stay for the entire four year eligibility 
period.  Often the most highly recruited players leave after as little as three years to enter 
into professional football.  Therefore, information is averaged for two years, three years, 
and four years to account for the potential impact an individual recruit or an entire 
recruiting class may have on team performance beyond the initial recruiting year.   
3.1.3 Head Coach Contract Characteristics 
 Contract characteristics consist of variables collected from university head coach 
contracts.  Contract characteristics are broken down into four subcategories: General and 
Salary, Performance Based Incentives, Non-Performance Based Incentives, and 
Termination and Buyout Clauses.  
3.1.3.1 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: General and Salary 
 General and salary contain contract year, total contract years, contract years 
remaining, annual salary, and other benefits paid to the coach.  Included are base salaries, 
other salaries, signing bonuses, outside income, and deferred income the coach is paid as 




Base salary, other salary and bonuses are considered to be guaranteed salary and 
in most cases are paid by the university.  Base salary, other salary, and bonus information 
are collected from the university’s head coaching contract.  Other salary contains 
additional salary paid from the university to the coach above what is considered his 
yearly base salary.  This could be in the form of retirement payments, yearly longevity 
payments, and personal expense accounts.  Signing bonuses are bonuses paid to the coach 
at the signing or the inception of the contract.   
Outside income opportunities are difficult to value and therefore are controlled for 
utilizing dummy variables. A university’s head football coaching contract specifying the 
coach may seek outside opportunities to earn income conducting a summer football camp 
is controlled utilizing an “Outside Income: Camp” dummy variable.  This variable will 
receive the value of 1 if the university’s head football coaching contract indicates he may 
seek opportunities to earn outside income by conducting a summer football camp, or 0 if 
the employment agreement does not specify or if it prohibits this.  This same procedure is 
utilized for clauses specifying other outside income opportunities for endorsements, 
equipment, shoe, apparel, and media appearances.     
Supplemental payments obtained by the coach for marketing appearances, and 
annuities are also contained within salary characteristics.  These payments differ from 
base salary, other salary and signing bonuses because these payments are not generally 
guaranteed in most contracts and are not typically paid by the university.  This is 
important when determining the compensation due the coach if the university terminates 




Deferred income is another important component in many head football coach 
contracts.  Deferred income payments may be included in a contract to incentivize the 
coach to stay at the university instead of leaving for other employment.  Generally, the 
coach only receives this payment if he is still employed as the head coach on a specified 
future date.  If the contract is terminated by the coach via the buyout clause, by the 
university with cause, or by the university without cause, the deferred income is forfeited.  
Some contracts, however, contain a clause allowing the coach to maintain his eligibility 
for the current deferred income balance in cases of termination without cause, death or 
long-term disability.   
 In general, base salary, other salary, and signing bonuses are considered to be 
guaranteed and supplemental market and annuity payments are not guaranteed.  In the 
case of this study, however, each contract year is an individual observation, and thus 
supplemental market and supplemental annuity payments are considered guaranteed for 
the current contract year.  Once a season begins supplemental market and annuity 
payments are generally paid even if a coach is terminated mid-season.  For the 
aforementioned reason, guaranteed salary is calculated as the summation of base salary, 
other salary, bonus, supplemental market, and supplemental annuity. 
In order to accurately measure the impact of performance incentives, maximum 
incentive is calculated as the summation of all monetary performance incentives.  It is 
assumed each coach met all of his performance measures as specified in his contract.  In 
other words the football coach won all regular season games, the conference division 




conference and the national coach of the year, achieved maximum national ranking, 
maximum attendance, maximum season ticket sales, and any other performance threshold 
leading to an increase of a performance bonus.  Due to the large variation in value of the 
non-performance incentives, these are not included in the calculation of the maximum 
incentive variable.   
The maximum total salary is calculated as the summation of both guaranteed 
salary and maximum incentives paid to the coach.  Additionally, the percent 
compensation that is guaranteed is calculated by dividing guaranteed salary by maximum 
total salary.  This variable is the identified as percent guaranteed salary.   
3.1.3.2 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives 
Performance incentives and non-performance incentives contain information 
about additional compensation paid to the coach for achieving agreed upon performance 
thresholds.  These performance thresholds may be for academics, game appearances, 
winning games, personal awards or honors, ticket sales, attendance and other 
performance thresholds. 
Due to the nature of collegiate sports, the academic performance of student 
athletes is closely monitored.  The NCAA maintains and requires member universities to 
submit information on the academic performance of their athletic programs.  Academic 
Progress Rate (APR) and Graduate Success Rate are two measures of academic 
performance the NCAA requires member universities to report.  To align the goals of the 




include academic performance incentives.  These incentives reward a coach for 
maintaining or improving the academic performance of athletes in the football program.  
For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the head coach meets the highest degree 
of academic performance and therefore, the academic performance incentive is 
maximized.   
Making an appearance in significant games is similarly important to a university 
football program.  Often making the appearance is more important than winning the 
game.  This is evidenced by the number of performance incentives contained in head 
coach contracts for appearing in key games.  Some of the key appearance incentives 
contained in head coaching contracts are for conference championship games, bowls 
games (there may be multiple incentives for the level of bowl game), and the national 
championship game.  Information for the appearance incentives is gathered from each 
contract. 
Winning games is a vital measure of a football program’s performance.  Many 
performance incentives are linked to winning a certain number of games or even one or 
two crucial games.  Many head football coaching contracts contain performance 
incentives rewarding a coach for each game he wins above a certain number of games.  
Moreover, many of these employment agreements contain significant incentives aimed at 
winning crucial games.  These include rivalry games, conference championship games, 
bowls games, and the national championship game.  Information for these incentives is 




Personal awards and honors such as conferences coach of the year, or national 
coach of the year, carry monetary incentives as well.  Information on the level of 
monetary incentives is collected from each contract.   
Other performance incentives paid to the coach are based on season ticket sales, 
single game ticket sales, or game attendance.  Other performance based incentive 
information are collected from head coaching contracts, added together and reported as 
“all other incentives.” 
As with the academic incentive, all the performance incentives are assumed to 
have been achieved at the highest level and reported as “maximum incentive.” 
3.1.3.3 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Non-Performance Incentives 
Non-Performance incentives are difficult to define in monetarily terms as there 
are vast differences in their value.  A country club membership can be valued very 
differently amongst different contracts depending on the level of the country club or 
location of the country club.  Most contracts do not report the name or location of the 
country club and makes valuation even more problematic.  Non-performance incentives 
are identified using dummy variables indicating the existence of a particular non-
performance incentive in the head coaching contract.  The monetary value added to each 
contract through non-performance incentives is minimal and should not bias the results of 
this study.  Some of the non-performance incentives gathered and reported in this study 
are automobile usage, country club memberships, spousal or family travel privileges, use 




3.1.3.4 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Termination and Buyout 
Termination and Buyout Characteristics refer to the existence of contract clauses 
specifying terms and conditions where the contract can be terminated.  Termination 
clauses can be viewed as options and are exercisable by the university with or without 
cause.  When the university terminates the head coach’s employment contract with cause, 
they can do so without paying the coach any further salary concessions.  However, when 
the university terminates the head coach without cause, the contract may stipulate that the 
university must pay certain salary concessions.  Similar to the option the university holds 
to terminate the employment contract, a buyout option can be viewed as an option 
exercisable by a head coach to terminate or buyout the remaining years of his 
employment agreement at a specified price.   
Most termination variables are controlled for using dummy variables to indicate 
whether the contract contains specific clauses allowing the university to terminate the 
coach’s contract with cause.  These clauses mention circumstances such as violation of 
conference rules, NCAA rules, contract clauses, university rules, laws leading to criminal 
charges of moral turpitude, or long term disability of the coach or the death of the coach.   
The university also has the option to terminate the contract without cause (any 
cause other than those identified above as circumstances of cause) but must do so at a 
cost.  The cost of exercising the option to terminate without cause is collected from the 
head coaching contracts.  Dummy variables are used to indicate whether the university is 
required to pay the balance of the coach’s deferred income account upon termination 




than head coach while still paying his base salary for the remainder of the contract term.  
Additionally, a dummy variable is used to indicate whether a contract contains a 
mitigation clause requiring the head coach to seek other employment opportunities after 
termination without cause.  Upon employment, the university would only be obligated to 
make up the difference in pay between the salary as a head coach and the new 
employment salary.   
 Buyout variables refer to the coach’s right to exclude the remaining contract term 
at a cost to the coach.  This buyout option is controlled using a dummy variable where the 
existence of the buyout option is given a value of 1, and the non-existence of the buyout 
option is given a value of 0.  The buyout cost specifies the charge the head coach must 
pay to the university to buyout the remaining years of the contract.  A coach will often 
buyout the remaining years of his contract in order to take a new coaching job either at 
another university or the NFL.  When the coach exercises this option, he may or may not 
be eligible for his deferred income and this is controlled for utilizing a dummy variable. 
3.2 Empirical Summary of Data 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables contained in this data set.  
Variables are again segregated into three categories: Coach Characteristics (Panel A), 
University Characteristics (Panel B), and Contract Characteristics (Panel C).  University 
Characteristics are further divided into three subcategories: General (Panel B1), Game 
Performance (Panel B2), and Recruiting Performance (Panel B3).  Contract 




(Panel C2), Non-Performance Incentives (Panel C3), and Termination and Buyout (Panel 
C4). 
3.2.1 Coach Characteristics 
 The mean (median) age for the 518 NCAA Football Bowl Division head football 
coaches in this study is 51.20 (51) years old.  Bobby Bowden (79), the 2009 head football 
coach for Florida State University, is the oldest coach in this study, while Lane Kiffin 
(34), the 2009 head football coach for the University of Tennessee is the youngest coach 
in the study.  [Note: Joe Paterno (81), the 2009 head football coach for Pennsylvania 
State University, is the oldest head coach in all of NCAA’s FBS.  However, Pennsylvania 
State University, did not release their contracts, citing privacy laws.  Therefore, his 
contract is not contained in this study.   
Out of the 518 university year observations, 93% (482) of the head coaches are 
Caucasian, 5% (26) are African American, and 2% (10) are from another race, such as 
Hispanic, Asian, or Samoan.  Note that 93% (777) coaches out of the potential 831 FBS 
are Caucasian, 5% (40) are African American, and 2% (15) are from another race.  
Therefore, in regards to race, the sample used in this study is a well represented sample of 
the population. 
The mean (median) number of years a head coach has been employed at his 
current university is 5.53 (4) years, with the lowest tenure being one year and the longest 
tenure, 34 years, by Bobby Bowden at Florida State University.  On average (median) 




university, leading to a mean (median) university winning percentage 54.00% (54%).  
The highest number of university games won is 316, while the most number of university 
games lost is 97.   Both numbers were achieved by Bobby Bowden.  The highest 
university winning percentage is 100% by Chris Peterson who in 2006 won all 13 games 
in his first year as Boise State University’s head football coach.   
The mean (median) number of career-years a head coach has been employed as a 
head football coach is 10.10 (8) years.   A number of coaches in this study have only been 
a head coach for 1 year, and the largest tenured head coach in this study is Bobby 
Bowden, who has been a head coach for 44 years.  An additional variable, head coaching 
age, is determined as the difference between the head coach’s age and career tenure.  This 
measures the relative age at which a head coach became a head coach.  The mean 
(median) head coaching age is 41.10 (41) years.  The youngest head coaching age is 21 
for Brian Kelly at both Central Michigan and Cincinnati. The oldest head coaching age is 
61 for Bill Doba at Washington State University.   
The mean (median) career wins for a university head coach is 71.84 (57) games, 
accompanied by the mean (median) career losses of 47.46 (40) games.  This leads to a 
mean (median) career winning percentage of 55.36% (58.00%).  The highest number of 
games won is 389, again by Florida State’s Bobby Bowden.  The most games lost is 160 
by Mike Price, the head coach for the University of Texas at El Paso. 
The highest career winning percentage in this study was 100%, again in 2006 by 




University.  As of 2009, the highest winning percentage among head coaches in this 
study was still Chris Peterson with a career winning percentage of 92%. 
As shown from the summary statistics, 92.28% of the head coaches voluntarily 
left their previous employment for the opportunity to become the head coach at their 
current university.  High performing coaches will not be fired from their previous 
employment because they are meeting or exceeding the expectations of their job position.  
They will, however, have new employment opportunities open up because of their 
performance that either pay more or are more prestigious and therefore, will voluntarily 
resign to accept the better opportunity.  Of the coaches in this study, 42.86% were 
experienced head coaches and had been a head coach previously, 17.57% were employed 
by a team in the NFL, and 15.64% held a position other then head coach at the university 
and were hired as the head coach from within the university. 
3.2.2 University Characteristics 
 We can determine a number of characteristics about the structure of the NCAA 
Football Bowl Division and the universities involved within this division from analyzing 
the summary statistics in this section.  As previously mentioned, the NCAA Football 
Bowl Division is comprised of 11 conferences.  The first set of variables describes the 
conferences and the university football programs within each conference.     
The biggest conference in terms of number of university-year observations in this 
study is the Mid-Atlantic Conference, with 62 university-year observations, and the 




is the Big East and the Mountain West Conference, each with 35 university-year 
observations.  In reality, the largest NCAA Football Bowl Division conference is the 
Mid-Atlantic Conference with 13 member schools, and the Big East and the SunBelt are 
both tied with the smallest number of member universities at eight each.  Again, in 
regards to conference affiliation, this study’s sample is consistent with the overall 
population.   
Figure 1 below shows, by conference, the number of university-year observations 
included in the study, the number of university-year observations not in the study, and the 
total number of university-year observations in the particular conference.   
Figure 1: Number of University Year Observations by Conference 
 
As part of the University Characteristics section, information regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the hiring, or a need to hire, of the current head football coach 
is reported.  Forty-two percent of the universities in this study sought new head coaches 
because their previous head coach either resigned to take another position at another 


















































universities in this study sought new head coaches after firing their previous head coach 
with or without cause.  Twenty-five percent of the universities previous head coaches 
went on to be head coaches at their new place of employment and 11.6% went on to be 
employed as a head coach in the NFL.   
Stadium size, total university endowment, and football revenues are potentially 
important determinants of compensation.  Stadium capacity, current endowment, and 
revenues can all serve as proxies for size.  As a university’s revenues from the football 
program increases, the university can afford to pay larger salaries.  These variables also 
serve as proxies for popularity or fan base.  As fan base increases, supplemental 
marketing salary would also increase, due to media’s ability to increase advertising 
revenues.   
This dissertation finds the mean (median) stadium has a capacity of 53,247 
(50,250).  The smallest stadium capacity is reported to be the University of Idaho with a 
capacity of 16,000 and the largest stadium capacity is reported as the University of 
Michigan with a reported capacity of 107,501.   
The mean (median) university endowment from 2003 to 2009 is $920,066,250 
($412,308,000).  It is evident that there is a high level of disparity between schools and 
this data is highly skewed to the larger endowments.  This is evident when we see Troy 
University has the smallest endowment of $17,542,000 and the University of Texas has 
the highest endowment of $16,171,184,000.  Figure 2 shows the average university 




Figure 2: Average University Endowment 
 
The average university general endowment has decreased since 2007 due to the 
investment losses of the recent financial crisis.  The decrease in general endowment has 
not only affected general university budgets, but has also affected university athletic 
department budgets.  As budgets decrease, there should be an overall decrease in the 
coach’s compensation as well. 
Mean (median) university football revenue is $17,908,752 ($12,205,141).  The 
median is smaller than mean as a number of universities football revenues far exceed 
other universities.  The University of Akron’s 2005 revenues of $740,749 represent the 
lowest revenues, and the University of Texas’ 2009 revenues of $ 93,942,815 represent 
the highest revenues in this study.  Figure 3 indicates that revenues have increased each 















 Figure 3: Average University Football Revenue 
  
3.2.2.1 University Characteristics: Game Performance 
Game Performance variables include university win/loss record, average 
attendance, and average attendance as a percent of stadium capacity.     
The mean (median) wins for the current year were 6.56 (7) games and loses were 
5.85 (6) games.  We can see the mean (median) wins for the previous season were 6.56 
(7) games and loses were 5.77 (6) games. 
 The mean (median) average attendance were 45,118 (41,209) people.  The 
University of Michigan had the largest reported average game attendance at 111,025 
people in 2004, and Eastern Michigan University reported the lowest average game 
attendance of 5,016 people in 2009.   
Percent stadium capacity is calculated by dividing the average attendance by 











reports the mean (median) attendance as a percent of stadium capacity for the average 
university is 79.67% (87.0%).  Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, reports an 
average attendance as a percent of stadium capacity of 117% in 2009.  This 
overestimation may be due to reporting differences.  When universities determine 
average attendance through ticket sales, there may be more tickets sold then seats 
allocated.  This leads to an estimation that exceeds both capacity and true attendance.  
When universities determine average attendance by tracking the number of tickets 
utilized for the game, a more accurate attendance is determined.  The university with the 
lowest reported attendance as a percent of stadium capacity is Eastern Michigan 
University with an average attendance as a percent of stadium capacity of 17% in both 
2005 and 2009.  
3.2.2.2 University Characteristics: Recruiting Performance 
Recruiting performance variables explain how well the university and the football 
program have recruited high school football talent.  The head coach is ultimately in 
charge of and responsible for the university’s football recruiting program.  If there is a 
change in a university’s head coach, the student athletes recruited by the previous head 
coach do not leave with the coach, they stay with the university.  There are rules in place 
protecting a university from losing the football recruits that have committed to play 
football for the university.  A student athlete right out of high school has four years of 
eligibility to play football.  The student athlete signs a letter of commitment indicating 
their intent to play all four years at one university.  If a player wishes to transfer to 




football eligibility leaving the student athlete three years of eligibility.  Though strongly 
influenced by a head coach, recruiting performance is better suited as part of university 
characteristics.  
Rivals, a popular recruiting and scouting service, use three indicators to measure 
university recruiting performance: Rank, Average Stars, and Points.  Table 2, Panel D 
summarizes the variable statistics for the four year average, three year average, and two 
year average for each of the recruiting variables (Rank, Average Stars, and Points).  For 
518 university programs, the mean (median) recruiting Rank as determined by rivals is 
57.86 (59) out of 120 NCAA Football Bowl Division universities ranked by Rivals.  The 
highest rank is understood to be equal to one each year with the potential that more than 
one school can receive a one ranking.  However, the lowest ranking could potentially be 
different then 120.  For instance if two schools were to tie for the lowest rank, as did Kent 
State University and the University of Texas El Paso in 2004,  then they would share a 
ranking of 118.
19
  The mean (median) for Average Stars as determined by Rivals from 
2003-2009 is 2.59 (2.46) stars out of 5 stars.  The highest Average Stars for the 2003-
2009 period is 3.94 received by the University of Florida’s recruiting class of 2009.  The 
lowest Average Stars for the 2003-2009 periods is 1.73 received by the University of 
Louisiana at Monroe’s 2006 recruiting class.  The mean and median rank and average 
stars are consistent with expectations.  The mean and median for rank should be expected 
to be 60 out of 120 and the mean and median for average stars 2.50 out of 5.  The mean 
(median) points as determined by Rival’s proprietary formula from 2003-2009 is 717.24 
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 In 2004 there were only 119 NCAA Football Bowl Division schools therefore the lowest ranking 




(406).  As determined by Rivals, the 2007 of University of Florida recruiting class has the 
highest points of 2959.  Rivals lowest points total was 39, achieved by the 2004 Kent 
State University’s recruiting class, the 2004 University of Texas El-Paso’s recruiting 
class, and the 2008 University of Northern Illinois’ recruiting class.  
Due to a student athlete’s four year eligibility, recruiting results from four years 
earlier can affect the universities current year football performance; therefore, 
information consisting of the last four years of recruiting performance for each university 
is gathered.  Recruiting information is combined to determine the effect of four year, 
three year, and two year recruiting performance.  Junior college student athletes typically 
have two years left of eligibility.  These recruits are also included in Rivals recruiting 
rankings.  Furthermore, student athletes can declare themselves eligible for the NFL draft 
three years after completing high school.  This makes it necessary to also test four year, 
three year, and two year recruiting variables for significance and robustness.   
3.2.3. Head Coach Contract Characteristics 
This section examines NCAA FBS head coach.  Understanding the characteristics 
of these contracts not only leads to an increased understanding of the nature of top 
athletic management employment agreements and compensation, but it can also lead to 
an increased understanding of the nature of top corporate executive management 
employment agreements and compensation.  This section focuses on summary statistics 
for salary (both guaranteed and non-guaranteed), performance incentives, non-




3.2.3.1 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: General and Salary 
The mean (median) term of NCAA FBS head coaching contracts from 2003-2009 
is 6.51 (6.00) years.  Miami University of Ohio’s head coach, Shane Montgomery, has a 
rolling one year contract representing the shortest employment agreement term, while 
Houston Nutt’s had a previous employment agreement with the University of Arkansas 
beginning on December 10, 1997 and expired on December 31, 2011, representing the 
longest contract term of 14.1 years.  In 2008, he voluntarily resigned and became the 
head football coach for the University of Mississippi.  Currently, Greg Schiano with 
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey the longest active contract term of 14 years.   
Base Salary, Other Salary, and Signing Bonus capture salary paid to the head 
football coach by the university.  These do not include supplemental salaries paid by 
other entities or university affiliated associations.  Base Salary, Other Salary, and Signing 
Bonus are considered guaranteed salary and are the foundation for determining the 
university’s obligation to the head coach when exercising the option to terminate the 
contract without cause. 
The mean head coach’s base salary from 2003-2009 is $288,716 with a median of 
$228,300.  This suggests data for this variable might be slightly skewed toward coaches 
with higher base salary contracts.  Charlie Weatherbie at the University of Louisiana at 
Monroe has the lowest base salary of $75,000, whereas Bobby Petrino at the University 
of Arkansas has the highest base salary of $1,900,000.  In most cases, base salary is only 




receives all of his compensation as base salary and he receives no supplemental salary 
compensation.   
There are only 115 NCAA FBS university head coaching contracts providing 
other salary paid by the university.  The mean (median) other salary for the 115 
employment agreement observations is $292,136 ($120,000).  The University of Iowa’s 
head coaching agreement with Kirk Ferentz provides for $1,800,000 as other salary.  This 
portion of his annual salary is identified in his contract as a longevity bonus paid if he 
remains the head football coach through June 1
st
 of each contract year.  Rick Stockstill of 
Middle Tennessee State University has a $4,800 unaccountable expense account which is 
included within other salary.  This expense account can be spent without any 
accountability. 
There were only 31 agreements providing signing bonuses.  Mark Snyder of 
Marshall University received a signing bonus of $25,000 when he signed a new contract 
in 2006, and Jeff Tedford of the University of California received a $1,000,000 bonus for 
signing a new contract extension in 2007. 
3.2.3.1.1 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: General and Salary: Outside 
Income 
Most head coach contracts provide opportunities for head coaches to earn 
additional outside income from sources other than the university through endorsements, 
equipment, shoe and apparel agreements, media agreements, and football camps.  The 




study.  The value of these clauses is difficult to determine.  The NCAA does require 
universities and head coaches to report all outside income sources in order to insure there 
are no violations of NCAA regulations; however, these reports are not made public and 
cannot be valued for this study.  This study simply identifies the existence of clauses 
contained in the contracts allowing the head football coach to receive outside income.  
Summary statistics show 90.25% of the contracts allow the head coach to receive outside 
income by holding summer football camps.  Universities often allow coaches to utilize 
their facilities, including dormitories for housing and meals, as well as the football 
equipment at nominal rates.  Normally, net profits received from summer football camps 
are considered outside income paid to the head coach.  Seventy-eight percent of the 
contracts allow the head coach to receive outside income from various endorsement 
agreements, 66.86 percent of employment agreements allow the head coach to receive 
outside income from equipment, shoe and apparel agreements, and 70.96% of 
employment agreements allow the head coach to receive outside income from media 
agreements.   
3.2.3.1.2 Head Coach Contracts Characteristics: General and Salary: Supplemental 
Salary 
 A significant portion of many head football coach’s compensation agreements 
contain supplemental payments.  These payments are paid by sources outside but closely 
affiliated with the university, such as athletic booster associations or equipment 
manufacturers.  The largest portion of these supplemental payments are received by the 




appearances, speeches, and equipment and apparel contracts.  These payments are 
classified as supplemental marketing salary.  Eighty-two percent of university head coach 
contracts from 2003-2009 include supplemental marketing salary.  The mean (median) 
supplemental marketing salary for a head coach is $661,231 ($505,000).  Florida Atlantic 
University’s head coach contract pays Howard Schnellenberger the lowest supplemental 
marketing salary of $1,000, whereas the University of Alabama’s head coach contract 
pays Nick Saban the highest supplemental marketing salary of $3,275,000.   
A paid annuity is another area form of supplemental salary.  Only five percent of 
the contracts include a paid annuity.  The mean (median) supplemental annuity payment 
is $128,840 ($125,000).  The head coach is paid this supplemental annuity each year of 
the contract. 
3.2.3.1.3 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: General and Salary: Deferred 
Income 
 Another popular feature of many head coach contracts create deferred annuity 
accounts.  Twenty-eight percent of the contracts contain deferred annuity payments, paid 
either by the university or an athletic association closely affiliated with the university.  
These accounts are set up and managed by the university and are intended to be an 
incentive for the head coach to remain at the university.  At the end of the deferred 
annuity payments, the coach is entitled to receive the balance and accrued interest.  The 
mean (median) length of a deferred annuity account is 5.41 (5.00) years.  In other words, 
a typical contract including a deferred annuity account pays five payments.  At the end of 




University of New Mexico’s head coach contract for Rocky Long provides for the 
longest deferred annuity account of 11 years.  The mean (median) deferred annuity 
payment is $163,872 ($100,000).  The highest deferred annuity payment was the 
University of Oklahoma’s Bob Stoops who received yearly annuity payments of 
$750,000.  These payments began in 2005 and continued until 2008 at which time Bob 
Stoops was paid the $3,000,000 in addition to any interest accrued in the account.  The 
lowest deferred annuity payment is Kent State University’s Doug Martin who is paid 
$10,200 from 2004-2006.  The mean (median) balance for a deferred annuity account 
from 2003-2009 is $359,205 ($250,000).  Again, the University of Oklahoma’s Bob 
Stoops has the highest deferred annuity balance of $3,000,000.   
3.2.3.1.4 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: General and Salary: Aggregated 
Salary 
 The four remaining variables provide aggregate compensation information from 
2003-2009.  These aggregate compensation variables are guaranteed compensation, 
maximum performance bonus, maximum compensation, and guaranteed compensation. 
 Guaranteed compensation captures the portion of a head coach’s contract that he 
is guaranteed to receive as long as he is employed as the head coach at the beginning of 
the football season.  Guaranteed compensation is calculated as the sum of base salary, 
other salary, bonuses, supplemental market compensation, and supplemental annuities.    
The mean (median) guaranteed compensation is $912,465 ($697,500).  The highest 
guaranteed compensation is $3,780,000 for the University of Texas’ head coach, Mack 




Monroe’s head coach, Charlie Weatherbie, whose guaranteed compensation in 2004, 
2005, and 2006 was $75,000.   
 Figure 4: Head Coach Guaranteed Compensation  
 
Figure 4 above indicates guaranteed compensation has increased from $663,419 in 2003 
to $1,171,198 in 2009, representing a total increase of 76.54%. 
Maximum performance incentive bonus is determined as the maximum 
performance compensation the university’s head football coach would receive if he were 
to achieve all his incentives as detailed in the contract.  Figure 5 shows the average 
maximum performance incentive bonus over 2003-2009.  In 2003, this value was 
$228,386 and increased to $430,821 in 2009, representing an overall increase of 88.64%.  
The mean (median) maximum performance bonus in this study is $350,936 ($280,000).  
The highest maximum bonus calculated from contracts over 2003-2009 was University of 
Arizona’s head coach, Dennis Erickson.  In 2008, if he achieved all of his performance 
incentives he would receive a bonus of $1,722,250.  The lowest maximum performance 













Genyk stands to make an additional $10,000 if he achieves all of his performance 
incentives.  There are multiple contracts that do not provide any performance incentives. 
Figure 5: Average Maximum Performance Incentive  
 
Maximum compensation is the sum of guaranteed compensation and maximum 
performance bonus.  This variable indicates the maximum compensation each head coach 
would earn from guaranteed salary and performance incentives as provided under the 
contract.  The mean (median) maximum compensation in this study is $1,263,402 
($1,000,000).  The highest maximum compensation is University of Texas’ head coach, 
Mack Brown, whose 2009 contract specifies he could potentially earn up to $4,630,000.  
The lowest maximum compensation is the University of Louisiana at Monroe’s head 
coach, Charlie Weatherbie, whose yearly maximum compensation from 2004-2006 was 
only $90,000.  Figure 6 indicates the average maximum compensation increased from 
$891,806 in 2003 to $1,602,019 in 2009.  This represents an 80% increase in the average 












Figure 6: Average Maximum Compensation   
 
Another important variable describes the percent of maximum total salary that is 
guaranteed under the employment agreement.  Guaranteed compensation is calculated by 
dividing guaranteed compensation by maximum compensation.  This variable is an 
indicator of how much of a head coach’s contract focuses on performance incentives.  
The higher the guaranteed compensation, the less incentive a head coach may have to 
work hard and perform well.  The lower the guaranteed compensation the more incentive 
the head coach will have to increase the performance of the football team.  Figure 7 
shows the guaranteed compensation from 2003 to 2009.  Interestingly, guaranteed 
compensation fell dramatically from 2003 to 2004.  It is uncertain if there was a cause for 
the fall or if this is due to the small number of observations in 2003.  From 2003-2009 the 
mean (median) guaranteed compensation is 73.65%, (75.13%).  There are 32 university 
head coach contracts where 100% of the compensation is guaranteed.  The university 















University’s Dabo Swinney, who in 2008 and 2009, the contract guaranteed only 20% of 
his compensation, meaning his contract has the highest performance incentive.   
Figure 7: Guaranteed Compensation 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives 
 The previous section specifies a head coach contract contains both guaranteed 
compensation provisions and performance incentive provisions.  Not all university head 
coach contracts contain performance incentives.  Over 93% of the contracts indicate that 
a portion of a coach’s compensation is to be paid in the form of performance incentives.  
Five percent of the contracts pay over one-half of the compensation in the form of 
performance incentives.  This section describes the various performance incentives 
















3.2.3.2.1 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives: 
Appearances 
A large portion of performance incentives contained in head coach contracts are 
tied to a football program appearing in a conference championship game, bowl game, or 
national championship game.  These incentives indicate that appearing in prestigious 
games is vital to universities and are as important as or more important than winning 
games.  This is not surprising as most bowl games, as well as other prestigious games, 
pay the university for the appearance, not for winning.  A university is allotted additional 
tickets to sell, thus increasing revenues regardless of the outcome.  There are more 
immediate financial rewards for universities whose football programs appear in a 
prestigious game. 
Out of the 518 employment agreements from 2003-2009, twenty percent provide 
an incentive paying the coach if the football program appears in the conference 
championship game.  The mean (median) bonus paid for an appearance in a conference 
championship game is $49,376 ($37,500).  The University of Colorado’s 2008 and 2009 
contract with Dan Hawkins allocates the highest incentive of $150,000 for appearing in 
the Big 12 conference championship game.  Both Ball State University and Eastern 
Michigan University provide the lowest performance incentive bonus of $5,000 for 
appearing in the Midwestern Athletic Conference championship games. 
The NCAA considers universities that win at least 6 regular season games as 
eligible to appear in a post season bowl game.  This seems to be a major performance 




employment agreements contain a performance incentive paying the coach a mean 
(median) bonus of $28,286 ($25,000) for appearing in a post season bowl game.  The 
University of Washington’s contract with Steve Sarkisian provides the highest 
performance incentive of $150,000 for participation in a post season bowl game.  Both 
Akron University and Ball State University contracts provide the lowest performance 
incentive of $2,500 for participation in a post season bowl game.  Additionally, 23% of 
head coach contracts contain an additional performance incentive for appearing in an 
upper tier bowl game.  The upper tier bowl games are determined by each university and 
are specified in the employment agreement, but stop short of the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS), bowls sanctioned by the NCAA FBS as the elite bowl games.  The mean 
(median) performance incentive for appearing in an upper tier bowl is $30,697 ($25,000) 
in addition to the performance incentive bonus paid for a post season bowl appearance.  
Both the University of Minnesota and the University of Houston provide the highest 
performance incentive of $75,000 for appearing in an upper tier bowl game.   
In 1998, the NCAA created what is known as the BCS, the elite five bowl games.  
Bowl games considered to be the BCS bowls are the Orange Bowl in Miami, the Sugar 
Bowl in New Orleans, the Fiesta Bowl in Phoenix, the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, and the 
BCS National Championship Bowl
20
.  The NCAA recognizes six BCS conferences in 
which the champions of those conferences automatically qualify for an appearance in one 
of the five BCS bowls
21
.  The teams within the other five non-BCS conferences must be 
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 The Bowl Championship Series National Championship game is currently on a four year rotation 
between Miami, New Orleans, Phoenix, and Pasadena, 
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 Currently the automatic qualifying BCS conferences are the Big 12 Conference, the Atlantic Coast 




ranked as a top twelve team according to the BCS ranking system to receive an at large 
bid to a BCS bowl.   
Sixty-four percent of the contracts contain a performance incentive allotting an 
additional mean (median) bonus of $58,966 ($50,000) for appearing in a BCS post season 
bowl.  The University of California provides Jeff Tedford the highest performance bonus 
of $300,000.  Additionally, 23% of the employment agreements stipulate if the football 
program appears in the BCS National Championship game, the head coach will receive 
an additional mean (median) performance bonus of $72,297 ($50,000).  Both the 
University of California and the University of Virginia provide the highest performance 
incentive bonus of $250,000.  
3.2.3.2.2 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives: Winning 
The previous section discussed the importance of appearing in key games; 
however, winning is still an important performance indicator.  Most head coach contracts 
include performance incentives that reward a head coach for winning games.  Twenty-six 
percent of employment agreements provide a performance incentive if their football 
program is recognized as a division champion of their conference.  This is usually 
obtained by holding the best win/loss record against the teams within the conference.  If 
multiple teams tie, then they are often considered as co-champions and the performance 
incentive bonus is still awarded.  The mean (median) performance incentive allotted to 
division champions within a NCAA FBS conference is $28,384 ($21,250).  The 




provide the highest performance incentive for winning a division championship of 
$100,000. 
Seventy-three percent of contracts contain a performance incentive paying the 
head coach a bonus if the team wins their conference championship.  The mean (median) 
performance incentive for winning their conference championship is $50,558 ($25,000).  
The highest performance incentive offered for winning a conference championship is 
$382,844 paid to Ralph Friedgen at the University of Maryland. Interestingly, this is the 
only performance incentive bonus in the University of Maryland’s employment 
agreement.  This performance incentive is paid in addition to the division championship 
bonus. 
Only 12 percent of the contracts contain a performance incentive for winning a 
bowl game.  The mean (median) bonus paid for winning a bowl game is $15,562 
($10,000), with the highest being $50,000 paid as part of the University of Central 
Florida’s, Iowa State University’s, and Georgia Tech University’s head coach contracts.  
Only one percent of the employment agreements contain a performance incentive paying 
$25,000 for winning an upper tier bowl.  Five percent of head coach contracts contain an 
additional performance incentive for winning a BCS post season bowl game.  The mean 
(median) performance incentive for winning a BCS post season bowl is $67,589 
($50,000).  The highest performance incentive for winning a BCS post season bowl game 
pays $250,000 to Georgia Tech University’s head coach Paul Johnson.   
Regarding performance incentives, university head coach contracts focus on game 




Winning the national championship is ultimately the goal of a university football 
program.  Thirty-seven percent of the contracts contain a performance incentive for 
winning the national championship.  The mean (median) incentive paid to the head coach 
for winning the national championship is $156,872 ($150,000).  The highest bonuses are 
contained in contracts for Oklahoma State University, the University of Alabama, and the 
University of Auburn, each paying $500,000 if their football team wins the national 
championship.  
Numerous contracts contain performance incentives rewarding head coaches 
winning a predetermined number of games within a single season.  The chart below 





Winning  Contracts with Mean  Median  
Games Performance Clause Incentive Incentive 
5 1% $2,000 $2,000 
6 5% $16,760 $10,000 
7 10% $20,343 $10,000 
8 17% $15,999 $10,000 
9 19% $22,340 $10,000 
10 20% $28,304 $10,000 
11 16% $33,565 $10,000 
12 12% $33,565 $10,000 
 
Dennis Erickson from Arizona State University tops this category, receiving the 




3.2.3.2.3 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives: Other 
  Other performance incentives include national ranking, conference coach of the 
year, national coach of the year, academic achievement, ticket sales, attendance, as well 
as a few others.   
 Thirty-eight percent of the contracts include performance incentives rewarding 
the head coach based on the football program’s final national ranking.  The mean 
(median) national ranking performance incentive is $69,083 ($50,000).  The highest 
bonus of $450,000 is awarded to Mack Brown as part of the University of Texas’ 2009 
contract.  
 Forty-one percent of the contracts also contain a personal performance incentive 
bonus tied to the coach receiving the conference coach of the year award.  The mean 
(median) incentive paid for this award is $20,036 ($20,000).  The highest performance 
incentive is $133,333 as part of University of South Carolina’s contract with Steve 
Spurrior. 
 Thirty-seven percent of contracts pay an incentive to the head coach for being 
named the national coach of the year.  The NCAA Football Bowl Division universities 
recognize more than one national coach of the year award; therefore, there may multiple 
coaches receiving this bonus each year.  The two most recognized national coach of the 
year awards are the Bear Bryant College Football Coach of the Year award, and the 
Liberty Mutual College Football Coach of the Year award.  The mean (median) incentive 




is $150,000 as part of New Mexico State University’s 2009 employment agreement with 
DeWayne Walker.   
 On the field performance is not all that universities attempt to maximize.  
Academic achievement incentives are included in 60 percent of the employment 
agreements.  These academic performance incentive bonuses pay the head coach based 
on the academic achievement of the student athletes in his football program.  Academic 
achievement is measured by rubrics developed by the NCAA such as graduate retention 
rate (GRR), cumulative grade point average (GPA), or academic progress rate (APR).  
This study assumes the university’s football program achieves the highest level of 
academic achievement, therefore maximizing the academic incentive allocated in the 
head coach’s contract.  The mean (median) academic achievement bonus is $53,461 
($27,353).  The highest academic achievement incentive, $275,000, is part of the Ohio 
State University’s employment agreement with Jim Tressel. 
The final variable describes various other performance incentives found within 
the contracts.  This variable includes such items as attendance incentives, game day ticket 
sale incentives, season ticket sale incentives, incentives rewarding certain conference or 
rivalry wins, recruiting incentives, incentives for the retention of football recruits, fund 
raising incentives, among other various incentives.  The mean (median) for all other 
performance incentives is $113,633 ($31,000).  The highest cumulative total other 
performance incentives is provided by the University of Kentucky’s contract with Rich 
Brooks, who would be paid $750,000 if their football team wins eight Southeastern 




3.2.3.3 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Non-Performance Incentives 
 In addition to the guaranteed compensation and performance incentives, the 
contracts also contain a number of non-performance or perquisite incentives.  This 
section focuses on these non-performance incentives.  Due to the wide difference and 
difficulty in the valuation of these incentives, this study does not focus on the value, but 
only accounts for the existence of these incentives. 
 One of the most prevalent non-performance incentives provided in head coach 
contracts is the use of a late model vehicle for the coach to utilize both for work and for 
personal needs.  Eighty percent of the contracts contain a provision for the use of at least 
one automobile.  Furthermore, 41% of the contracts contain a clause for the use of a 
second vehicle by the spouse of the head football coach.   
 Another common non-performance incentive contained in 56% of head coach 
contracts is a clause providing a country club membership to the head coach and his 
family to use at their discretion, either for business, for recruiting, or for personal use.  
There are even a few contracts providing multiple country club memberships.   
 Twenty percent of head coaching contracts also grant spousal travel.  In these 
contracts, the spouse is able to travel on recruiting trips, to away games, and to 
postseason bowl games the team may be participating in.  A few contracts extend this 
provision for the entire family; however, for the purpose of this study we have included 




 Twenty-six percent of the contracts provide a stadium suite for use at the head 
coach’s discretion for every home football game.  Additionally, 49% of the contracts 
allocate an allotment of football tickets, again to be used at the head coach’s discretion, 
either for personal use or for business use.  The mean (median) ticket allotment under 
these contracts is 18 (20) tickets with the highest ticket allotment of 50 tickets provided 
to Mark Mangino, the head coach for the University of Kansas.   
 These contracts also include provisions allotting tickets to other university 
sporting events such as men’s and women’s basketball, baseball, hockey, or all sports 
passes.  Thirty-four contracts have such an allotment.  The mean (median) ticket 
allotment for other university sponsored sports besides football is 6.24 (4).  The highest 
allotment of 30 tickets is provided to Jeff Tedford from the University of California. 
 Another non-performance incentive, which may appear as a performance 
incentive, is a ticket allotment to a post season bowl game.  If the team is invited to a post 
season bowl, only 14% of the university head coaching contracts specify an allotment of 
tickets to the bowl game.  This seems to be low.  Most coaches may receive some 
allotment; however, it is not specified within the contract.  The mean (median) allotment 
of tickets to a post season bowl in which the team is participating is 22.66 (16) tickets.  
The University of Cincinnati’s employment agreement allocates the highest allotment of 
200 tickets to be utilized by head coach, Brian Kelly.  Brian Kelly’s allotment is an 
extreme outlier, and may be due to his contract specifying these tickets represent the total 
allotment of tickets to the entire football program including those to be used by assistant 




 The contracts include a number of other non-performance incentives which have 
not been described and detailed within this study.  For instance, some contracts specify 
that upgrades will be made in football facilities.  Other contracts allot the use of an 
aircraft to the head coach for recruiting and for personal purposes.  Personal use is 
allocated in terms of flight hours available to the head coach during the contract year.  
Other contracts provide the head coach with an interest free loan to be used in acquiring a 
home, tuition waivers for immediate family members, or additional life insurance.  All of 
these non-performance incentives add additional value to the contract.  These other 
perquisites exist in 41% of the employment agreements.  The mean (median) number of 
additional non-performance or perquisite incentive bonuses from 2003-2009 university 
head coaching employment agreements is 3.42 (3).  These non-performance or perquisite 
incentives are not included in any of the valuations of the compensation as they vary 
across contracts and one may be valued much differently then another.  Therefore, the 
above section is simply a description of these non-performance incentives and perquisites 
many head football coaches enjoy as part of their contracts. 
3.2.3.4 Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Termination and Buyout 
 Similar to corporate executive employment agreements, university head coach 
contracts contain clauses dealing with termination or buyout of the contract by either the 
university or by the head football coach.  Termination and buyout provisions are 





 Terminating a head football coach with cause is usually due to specific reasons 
stated within the university head coach contracts.  For instance, there are seven clauses 
almost uniformly found in all university head coach contracts.  These clauses are: 
violating NCAA rules, violating conference rules, violating university rules, violating 
employment agreements clauses, committing a criminal act of moral turpitude, death, and 
long-term disability.  The first four (violating NCAA rules, violating conference rules, 
violating university rules, and violating employment agreement clauses) are included in 
every employment agreement within this study.  Committing a criminal act of moral 
turpitude was included in 98.65% of the employment agreements.  The only employment 
agreements not containing the aforementioned clause are contracts between Florida State 
University and Bobby Bowden.  His contract is very short and simple perhaps due to his 
34 year tenure at Florida State University.  Termination with cause due to death is 
included in 82.59% of the contracts and long-term disability is included in 85.88% of the 
contracts.  Termination with cause enables the university to terminate the contract 
without further compensation to the head football coach.  This includes any payments 
contained within a deferred income account.  Only 16 (3%) of the university head 
coaching employment agreements specify if a coach is terminated with cause, the 
university will still pay the balance of the deferred income account.   
 Other cases of early termination not mentioned above are considered termination 
without cause.  Terminations without cause often occur due to a programs declining 
performance or differences arising due to personality conflicts.  When a head coach is 
terminated without cause, there is usually a cost to the university detailed in the contract.  




the contract with a termination without cause provision is an option to call back the 
contract at a given strike price.  Ninety-eight percent of the contracts have a termination 
without cause provision allowing the university to terminate the head coaching contract 
(thus terminating the head coach’s employment).  However, there is a price to exercising 
this option.  The mean (median) payoff or exercise price is $2,920,854 ($1,500,000) with 
the highest exercise price of $28,000,000 in the 2007 University of Alabama’s head 
coach contract with Nick Saban.   As is the case with the University of Alabama’s 
contract, each year the exercise price is reduced in most contracts. 
As part of the termination without cause provision, 39% of the employment 
agreements require the head coach to mitigate the pay off or exercise price by actively 
seeking other employment opportunities within the athletic labor market.  If, or when, he 
finds other employment, the exercise price for termination without cause will be reduced 
to only cover the difference between what he would have been compensated under the 
terminated contract and his compensated under his new contract. 
Eighteen percent of the contracts include a provision entitling the head football 
coach to receive the balance of the deferred income account at the time of termination 
without cause.  Additionally, 18% of the contracts permit the university to reassign the 
head coach to other duties within the university and continue to pay him his base salary 
but forgo any other supplemental salaries.   
The final termination option typically provided by head coach contracts is 
controlled by the head coach.  Similar to the university’s option to terminate the contract 




head coach contract without cause.  This is known as a buyout clause.  Eighty-seven 
percent of the contracts in this study contain a buyout clause.  Again, there is a cost 
associated with the exercise of this option by the head coach.  Most head coaches opting 
to exercise this option do so in order to take another more prestigious head coaching job.  
Therefore, the buyout cost is typically paid for by the head coach’s new university.  The 
mean (median) buyout exercise price established by the contracts from 2003-2009 is 
$1,037,388 ($500,000).  The highest buyout price, $13,440,000, is a part of the 
University of Georgia’s contract with Mark Richt.  Upon the exercise of this option, the 
head coach agrees to forfeit any future compensation provided in the contract including 
any deferred compensation.  Only two percent of the contracts contain a provision 







The previous chapter provided a detailed discussion and summary statistics of the 
variables collected as part of this study of university head coach contracts.  Chapter 4 
examines the determinants of head coaching contracts utilizing univariate, multivariate 
empirical tests, describes the econometric models used to analyze the contracts, and 
summarizes the results of these empirical tests.   
4.1 Univariate Tests 
This study employs univariate tests to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between the mean and median values of variables analyzed from university 
head coach contracts whose maximum compensation is either above or below the 
median.  The results are presented in Table 3.  The first test is a simple parametric 
univariate test.  Difference of means and medians tests are run by dividing the sample of 
contracts into two subgroups, those whose maximum compensation falls below the 
median of $1,000,000, referred to as low compensation agreements, and those with 
maximum compensation above the median of $1,000,000, referred to as high 
compensation agreements.  Reported t-statistic’s provide a two-tailed test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean values do not differ.  The second test is a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon sign-rank univariate test to test the difference of median tests, again splitting 
university head coach contracts into two subgroups, low compensation agreements and 




tailed test of the null hypothesis, indicating whether the median values do or do not 
differ.   
4.1.1 Univariate Tests: Coach Characteristics 
 It is expected that there should be significant differences between head coaches 
receiving low compensation agreements and those receiving high compensation 
agreements.  This section discusses some of those characteristics.
22
   
As shown in Table 3 Panel A, univariate tests indicate head coaches with high 
compensation have significantly higher university tenure (mean difference of 6.2 years 
vs. 4.9 years; 1% level) as well as total career experience (mean difference of 11.7 years 
vs. 8.5 years; 1% level) as a head coach then coaches with low compensation.  High 
compensation coaches also have significantly more university (mean difference of 49 
wins vs. 32 wins; 1% level) and career wins (mean difference of 90 wins vs. 54 wins; 1% 
level).  A greater number of wins may be a function of the number of games coached.  If 
this were true it would be reasonable to expect the number of losses for coaches with high 
compensation to also be greater than low compensation coaches.  Interestingly, though 
high compensation coaches have significantly higher university tenure and career 
experience, there is not a significant difference in their number of university losses (mean 
difference of 27 losses vs. 28 losses) in both mean and median tests, and only a slight 
significance difference for career losses (mean difference of 50 losses vs. 45 losses; 10% 
level) when using the parametric t-tests.  There is however stronger evidence showing 
high compensation coaches have significantly more career losses than low compensation 
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coaches, based on the differences of median values, when utilizing the Wilcoxon sign 
rank non-parametric test (median difference of 46 losses vs 45 losses; 1% level).   
Evidence does indicate that high compensation coaches win more games than low 
compensation coaches.  Results for both university winning percentages (mean difference 
of 59% vs. 47%; 1% level) and career winning percentages (mean difference of 61% vs. 
49%; 1% level) show high compensation coaches have higher winning percentages, both 
university and career, than low compensation coaches.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that as a coach increases performance, as measured by winning football 
games, his market value and thus his maximum compensation will increase.   
Other characteristics significantly different between high compensation coaches 
and low compensation coaches are past head coach experience and previous NFL football 
coaching experience.  There are significantly more high compensation coaches with 
previous head coaching experience (mean difference of 51% vs. 35%; 1% level) than low 
compensation coaches.  Additionally there are significantly more high compensation 
coaches with previous NFL football coaching experience (mean difference of 22% vs. 
13%, 1% level). The age of head coaches exhibits mixed results.  Parametric t-tests 
indicate there is not a significant difference between high compensation coaches and low 
compensation coaches.  However the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign rank tests show that 
age is significantly higher for high compensation coaches than for low compensation 
coaches (median difference of 52 years versus 50 years; 10% level).  A coach’s race, 
whether he voluntarily resigned from his previous coaching position, and whether the he 




percent or greater significance level) between high compensation coaches and low 
compensation coaches. 
4.1.2 Univariate Tests: University Characteristics 
 Table 3 Panel B1 presents univariate test results for university characteristics.  
Again it is presumed there are significant differences in the universities with high 
compensation and those universities with low compensation.  During the 2010-2011 
football season there have been a number of universities announce that beginning with 
the 2011-2012 season they will be change conferences.  The following changes were 
announced: the Big-10 Conference will extend from 11 universities 12 with the addition 
of Nebraska, the Pacific Athletic Conference-10 (PAC-10) will grow from the current 10 
to 12 with the addition of the University of Utah, University of Colorado, the Big East 
added Texas Christian University, and the Mountain West Conference (MWC) lost 
Brigham Young University, but added Boise State, Fresno State University, and the 
University of Nevada, and the Western Athletic Conference (WAC) will be adding Texas 
State University, and University of Texas-San Antonio.
23
 The question arises, how would 
this effect university head coaching?  Results from the univariate tests shows there to be a 
significant difference between conferences for universities with high compensation 
contracts and universities with low compensation contracts.  Universities in the Big 12 
Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the Southeastern Conference (SEC), the 
Big East Conference, the Big-10 Conference, and the Pacific Athletic Conference-10 
(PAC-10) have a significantly greater probability (1% level) of having a high 
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compensation contract. Universities in Conference USA (CUSA), the Mid-American 
Conference (MAC), the Mountain West Conference (MWC), the SunBelt Conference, 
and the Western Athletic Conference (WAC) have a significantly higher probability of 
having a low compensation contract.   
Univariate test results do not show a significant difference between universities 
with high or low compensation contracts except Universities with high compensation 
contracts are significantly more likely at the 1% level to lose their head coach to the NFL 
than universities with low compensation contracts.  Sixteen percent of universities with 
high compensation contracts lose their head coach to the NFL versus seven percent of the 
universities with low compensation contracts. 
Stadium capacity, university endowment and revenues all show significant 
differences between universities with high or low compensation contracts.  Univariate 
test results indicate universities with high compensation contracts have significantly 
larger stadium capacities (mean difference of 68,319 vs. 38,406; 1% level) than 
universities with low compensation contracts.  Univariate test results also demonstrate 
that universities with high compensation contracts have significantly larger endowments, 
both current endowment (mean difference of $1,440 million vs. $310 million; 1% level) 
and one year lagged endowment (mean difference of $1,424 million vs. $291 million; 1% 
level) than universities with low compensation contracts.  Finally, universities with high 
compensation contracts have significantly larger revenues, both current revenues (mean 




difference of $27 million vs. $7 million; 1% level) than universities with low 
compensation contracts.  
4.1.2.1 Univariate Tests: University Characteristics: Game Performance 
 Table 3 Panel B2 presents the results for game performance.  As has previously 
been discussed, coaches with high compensation contracts have significantly more 
university and career wins than coaches with low compensation contracts.  
Correspondingly, univariate tests confirm universities with high compensation contracts 
win significantly more games (mean difference of 8 wins vs. 6 wins; 1% level) and lose 
significantly fewer games (mean difference of 5 losses vs. 7 wins; 1% level) in both the 
current year, and the previous year.  Moreover, universities with high compensation 
contracts have significantly higher average attendance (mean difference of 63,323 vs. 
26,983; 1% level) at their home football games, in both the current year and previous 
year.  This may simply be a function of a previous finding; universities with high 
compensation contracts have significantly larger stadium capacities.  If true, controlling 
for stadium capacity by determining game attendance as a percent of stadium capacity is 
essential.  Univariate results indicate universities with high compensation contracts have 
significantly higher attendance as a percentage stadium capacity (mean difference of 92% 
vs. 68%; 1% level) than universities with low compensation contracts.  It is evident from 
the above univariate results that universities with high compensation contracts exhibit 
significantly greater game performance than universities with low compensation 




4.1.2.2 Univariate Tests: University Characteristics: Recruiting Performance 
 We can assume, holding everything else constant, corporations hiring the best 
labor talent will have better results than corporations hiring lesser talent.  Likewise, we 
can assume, holding everything else constant, universities recruiting the best football 
talent will perform better than universities recruiting lesser talent.  Under this assumption, 
universities should be willing to offer head football coaches who recruit better talent, 
higher compensation as compared to head football coaches who recruit lesser talent.  
Results of univariate test (see Table 3 Panel B3) confirm this assumption and find 
universities with high compensation contracts are significantly (1% level) better at 
recruiting talent, regardless of measure, than universities offering low compensation 
contracts.   
4.1.3 Univariate Tests: Contract Characteristics 
 A key question of concern in this study concerns the makeup of NCAA FBS head 
coach’s contracts.  The first two critical dimensions of remuneration policies identified 
by Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) are to understand and know the total benefits 
associated with the job or position including the costs and benefits of non-pecuniary 
aspects of the job, and what is the composition of the remuneration package.  This section 
examines the difference of mean and median results of head coach contract variables and 






4.1.3.1 Univariate Tests: Contract Characteristics: General and Salary 
 It should be noted that there is a significant difference (5% level) between the 
number of high compensation contracts in 2009 and the number of low compensation 
contracts.   This is most likely due to the overall increase in head coach compensation 
over the period examined.  In a market where compensation is increasing, there should be 
a greater number of high compensation agreements in the later years.  In years 2003-2008 
there is no significant difference between the number of high and low compensation 
contracts.   
Does the length of the contract differ between high and low compensation 
contracts?  Univariate tests indicate both the term (mean difference of 7 years vs. 6 years; 
1% level) and the number of years remaining (mean difference of 5 years vs. 4 years; 1% 
level) on the agreement is significantly longer for high compensation agreements then for 
low compensation agreements.   When a coach increases his performance, the university 
will increase compensation and length of the employment agreement to secure his 
services for a longer period of time.  Additionally, as the coach increases his performance 
he may seek to renegotiate his agreement increasing both compensation and length.   
 It can be anticipated that results of univariate tests will indicate a significant 
difference in salary levels between high and low compensation contracts.  Results 
indicate a significant difference in base salary (mean difference of $361,051 vs. 
$211,537; 1% level), a significant difference in other salary (mean difference of $451,326 




$324,022 vs. $75,020; 10% level) paid between high compensation agreements and low 
compensation agreements.   
 Outside income opportunities are an intrical part of head coach contracts.  
Univariate test results indicate outside income opportunities are significantly (5% level) 
more prominent in low compensation contracts than in high compensation contracts. This 
presents an opportunity for universities offering low compensation contracts to remain 
competitive by allowing head coaches to increase their income through outside income 
opportunities.   
 Univariate test results show a significant difference in the level of the 
supplemental marketing compensation (mean difference of $1,062,386 vs. $180,682; 1% 
level) present between high and low compensation contracts.  These supplemental 
marketing payments compensate the head coach for various media, marketing, 
endorsement, and public relation opportunities and responsibilities and represent a large 
portion of compensation.   
 Deferred income accounts are a means by which a university can reward a head 
coach for completing the term of the contract.  Univariate test results find deferred 
income accounts are present in significantly more high compensation contract than low 
compensation contract (mean difference of 32% vs. 22%; 5% level).  Furthermore the 
terms of these deferred income accounts are also significantly different in the following 
manner: yearly deferred annuity payments ($238,007 vs. $58,855; 1% level) are 




higher for high compensation versus low compensation contract.  Univariate test results 
find the term of deferred income payments is not significantly different.   
Univariate test results indicate guaranteed salary (mean difference of $1,478,342 
vs. $355,262; 1% level) and maximum performance incentive bonus (mean difference of 
$579,211 vs. $126,160; 1% level) are both significantly different between high and low 
compensation contracts. Guaranteed salary and maximum performance incentive bonus 
are both determinants of maximum compensation, thus it should be expected that high 
compensation contracts exhibit higher levels of guaranteed salary, as well as higher levels 
of maximum performance incentive bonuses, than low compensation contracts.  
Univariate test results also show the guaranteed compensation under the contract is 
significantly different (mean difference of 71% vs. 77%; 1% level) between high 
compensation contracts than low compensation contracts.  Interestingly, low 
compensation contracts exhibit a significantly higher guaranteed compensation as 
compared to high compensation contracts. 
4.1.3.2 Univariate Tests: Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives 
 This section examines the univariate tests for performance incentives within 
university head coaching contracts to determine whether there are significant differences 
between high compensation and low compensation contracts (see Table 3 Panel C2). 
 A key group of performance incentives compensate the head coach for appearing 
in prestigious games such as bowl and championship games.  For university head 
coaching contracts from 2003-2009, univariate test results indicate high compensation 




game (mean difference of $65,390 vs. $15,405; 1% level) and/or qualifying for and 
appearing in an NCAA sanctioned bowl game (mean difference of $37,458 vs. $17,402; 
1% level) than low compensation contracts.   
As discussed in Section 3.2.3.2.1, many of these contracts contain an additional 
performance incentive for appearing in an upper tier bowl game.  When contracts contain 
such an incentive, univariate results are inconsistent as to whether it is significantly 
different between high and low compensation contracts.  Parametric t-test indicate there 
is not a significant difference but the Wilcoxon sign rank non-parametric test indicates a 
significantly higher bonus is paid for appearances in upper tier bowl games (mean 
difference of $31,922 vs. $26,218; 1% level) between high and low compensation 
contracts.  
According to univariate test results, high compensation contracts pay significantly 
higher bonuses for an appearance in a Bowl Championship Series (BCS) bowl (mean 
difference of $63,034 vs. $52,368; 10% level) than low compensation contracts.  
However, the univariate results are mixed regarding the incentive for appearing in the 
national championship game.  The parametric t-test indicates a significantly higher bonus 
paid in high compensation contracts for appearing in the national championship game 
(mean difference of $75,833 vs. $53,684; 10% level), but the Wilcoxon sign rank non-
parametric test indicates no significant difference.   
Section 3.2.3.2.2 shows evidence that winning prestigious games is not as 
important as appearing in these key prestigious games.  Univariate results indicate high 
compensation contracts provide significantly higher mean incentives for winning division 




($74,080 vs. $18,710; 1% level), bowl games ($37,083 vs. $10,595; 1% level), BCS bowl 
games ($82,895 vs. $35,278; 10% level), and national championship games ($172,580 vs. 
$82,146; 1% level)  than offered by low compensation contracts.
24
  
Performance incentives are not only paid for winning key games, but many 
contracts also provide performance incentives for winning a specified number of games 
each season.  Univariate test results conclude that when contracts contain incentives for 
winning games, the bonus is found to be significantly higher (1% level) for the high 
compensation contracts than for low compensation contracts.   
Mean performance incentives such as national ranking ($108,847 vs. $25,971; 1% 
level), conference coach of the year ($47,153 vs. $11,812; 1% level), national coach of 
the year ($47,153 vs. $23,661; 1% level), academic achievement ($76,194 vs. $20,782; 
1% level) and other performance incentives (mean difference of $202,078 vs. $46,561; 
1% level) are all found to be significantly higher for high versus low compensation 
contracts.   
4.1.3.3 Univariate Tests: Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Non-
Performance Incentives 
Non-performance incentives (perquisites) are another crucial aspect of NCAA 
FBS university head coach contracts.  Valuing non-performance incentives can be 
problematic; therefore, this study determines whether there is a significant difference in 
the probability the non-performance incentive exists in high versus low compensation 
employment contracts.   
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As shown in Table 3 Panel C3 test results indicate high compensation contracts 
are more likely to contain provisions providing the head coach one automobile (mean 
difference of 86% vs. 74%; 1% level), a second automobile for their spouse (mean 
difference of 63% vs. 19%; 1% level), country club memberships (mean difference of 
62% vs. 50%; 1% level), spouse or family travel privileges (mean difference of 4% vs. 
17%; 10% level), and the use of a football stadium suite (mean difference of 34% vs. 
18%; 1% level).   
Univariate tests do not indicate a significant difference in the number of home 
football game tickets or bowl game tickets for high compensation contracts versus low 
compensation contracts.  However, univariate tests do indicate high compensation 
contracts allocate more tickets to non-football sporting events (mean difference of 7 
tickets vs. 5 tickets; 5% level) than low compensation contracts.   
Finally, test results indicate high compensation employment contracts contain a 
greater total number of perquisite provisions (4.2 vs. 2.7) than low compensation 
contracts.  
4.1.3.4 Univariate Tests: Head Coach Contract Characteristics: Termination and 
Buyout 
Univariate tests conclude there is not a significant difference in the conditions 
where universities may terminate the agreement with cause between high and low 
compensation contracts.  Three exceptions to the previous findings include: termination 
for cause due to criminal turpitude, termination with cause due to long term disability, 
and retention of deferred income funds upon termination for cause.     




cause (mean difference of $4.814 million vs. $1.006 million; 1% level), and the cost of 
buying out the remaining term of the contracts (mean difference of $1.635 million vs. 
$0.442 million; 1% level) are significantly 1% level higher in high compensation versus  
low compensation contracts. 
Univariate test results further show it is significantly more likely for high 
compensation contracts to allow the head coach to retain deferred income funds upon the 
termination without cause (5% level) or the buyout of the contract (10% level).  
However, univariate test results find it significantly more likely that low compensation 
contracts allow the university the right of reassignment (5% level) than high 
compensation contracts.  Finally, univariate tests do not find a significant difference 
between the existence of buyout and mitigation provisions between high compensation 
contracts and low compensation contracts.  
4.2 Multivariate Tests 
Previous discussion has centered on univariate tests examining significant 
differences between university head coach contracts characteristics whose maximum 
compensation is above and below the median of $1,000,000.  This section discusses the 
multivariate test models that are utilized to determine which variables are significant 
determinants of maximum compensation as well as the guaranteed compensation as 




Models one through four, examine the significant variables explaining maximum 
compensation and models five and six examine guaranteed compensation. 
4.2.1 Multivariate Tests: Discussion of Variables 
 Compensation literature from the fields of finance and organizational 
management are utilized to develop models estimating the determinants of maximum 
compensation.  These models aid our understanding of which factors increase a head 
coach’s maximum compensation.  The following section discusses the variables and 
presents the models used in determining maximum compensation and guaranteed 
compensation as predicated by university head coach contracts. 
4.2.1.1 Multivariate Tests: Discussion of Variables: Size 
 Previous literature indicates that both firm size and market size are important 
determinant of compensation.
25
  Studies of public corporations by Ciscell and Carroll 
(1980), Murphy (1985), Dunlevy (1985), and Jensen and Murphy (1990) show firm size 
is positively related to the compensation level of a chief executive officer.  Scully (1974, 
1989) determines that market size plays a significant part in determining team revenues 
but is not significant when included in a regression of MLB player salaries.  Scully, Jones 
and Walsh (1988) find mixed results for the significance of a market size effect in their 
study of salary determinates of NHL players.  Burgar and Walters (2003) show that teams 
in large markets value a player six times more than teams in small markets, leading to the 
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determination that market size has a significant effect on compensation.  Finally, 
Humphreys and Mondello (2008), also find market size increases team value.   
It is reasonable to assume that the larger the university, the more they can pay 
their head football coach.  One indicator of size is university enrollment.  The above 
studies indicate a variable for size should be included in a model of maximum 
compensation.  Many corporate finance studies use variables such as total assets, sales, 
and revenues to proxy for firm size.  The question now becomes, “What is the 
appropriate determinant of market size for NCAA FBS universities?”   
Athletic studies, focusing on determinants of professional sports franchise values, 
use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) to measure market size.  In terms of college 
sports, this variable may not be an accurate measure of market size.  Many large 
universities are located in small communities, while small universities are located in large 
metropolitan areas.  For example, Texas A&M University, the United States 6th largest 
university with total enrollment of 48,702 students,
26
 is located in College Station-Bryan, 
Texas MSA which has a current population of 212,268.
27
  San Diego State University has 
an enrollment of 32,817
28
 and is located in the San Diego, Carlsbad, San Marcos, CA 
MSA, which has a population of 3,053,793.
29
  While San Diego MSA has a larger 
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population, they also have more football sports programs, such as the NFL’s San Diego 
Chargers, University of Southern California, and University of Los Angeles.  
Additionally, MSA information does not control for organizational identification effect of 
university alumni living outside of the MSA.
30
  Similar to organizational identification 
model of alumni loyalty, university sports fans also exhibit a form organizational 
identification loyalty. Collegiate sports fans are not necessarily alumni of any university 
yet they pledge their allegiance similar to the alumni of the university, therefore 
measuring market size using MSA as a proxy does not account for alumni and non-
alumni supporters outside of the MSA.   
Endowment, stadium capacity, and revenue are also potential proxies for market 
size.  Total firm assets are used when measuring firm size; similarly, university 
endowment can be used to measure the size of the university.  Endowment measures the 
financial contributions supporters of a particular university make toward growing the 
goals of the university.  Alumni and non-alumni, regardless of location, can support their 
university of choice by making a contribution to the university’s endowment.  
Furthermore, while this measure does not measure the number of supporters, it does 
measure their relative level of support.  There are different levels of support.  There may 
be a supporter who watches every game on TV but does not go to any of the games, and 
they may buy university licensed attire to show support but do not contribute to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Metropolitan Statistical Area for July 1, 2007.  This data can be found at 
http://www.census.gov/popest/metro/CBSA-est2009-annual.html. 
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loyalty of alumni to the university in which they attended. “Alumni and their alma mater: A partial test of 
the reformulated model of organizational identification,” Mael and Ashworth (1992) define organizational 
identification as “a perceived oneness with an organization and the experience of the organization’s 




university’s endowment.  On the other hand, there may be a supporter who not only 
purchases season tickets and attends every game but also makes additional contributions 
in order to get access to premium seats or perhaps even a suite.  These supporters also 
tend to give generously to a university’s endowment.  One disadvantage of utilizing 
endowment as an indicator of market size is that a university’s endowment is used to 
support academics, buildings, and athletics, not simply football.  Therefore, universities 
with large endowments do not necessarily have large football programs.  However, 
universities with large endowments that have small football programs tend to be private 
and are not included in this study.  Therefore, this mitigates this disadvantage and does 
not create a bias in the analysis.   
Stadium size is also a potential indicator of a university football program’s market 
size.  Universities with larger football markets may find it profitable to build bigger 
stadiums in order to sell more tickets; therefore, stadium size should be positively 
correlated with market size.  However, some schools share use of stadiums with 
professional sports, such as the University of Arizona, and some utilize municipal 
stadiums such as the University of Southern California and the University of Alabama-
Birmingham.  The size of these stadiums are not necessarily good indicators of university 
football program’s market sizes.    
Revenue is the only common measure of size utilized by both firms and university 
programs.  Revenue generated by the football program is another possible indicator of a 
university football program’s market size.  Universities may have large stadiums, but 




overestimation of a university football program’s market size.  Universities having large 
football program markets should expect to see a larger number of tickets sold, a larger 
amount of officially licensed apparel purchased, and more games televised.  All of the 
preceding factors lead to an increase in university football revenues.  One potential 
disadvantage of utilizing football generated revenues is that this size measure is also an 
indication of performance.  This dilemma is also addressed by Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
and Murphy (1985, 1986) and is alleviated by dropping size from their set of regressors.  
When a university’s football program increases performance in terms of winning football 
games, revenues should increase relative to an increase in ticket sales, apparel sales and 
media coverage.   
When including a size regressor, multiple proxies for size are tested to determine 
whether results are robust to the choice of proxy.  When size is used as a regressor in 
modeling for maximum compensation, it is expected to have a positive and significant 
effect.   
4.2.1.2 Multivariate Tests: Discussion of Variables: Performance 
 Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1985, 1986) have shown performance to 
be a significant determinant of compensation.  Additionally, Mirrlees (1976), Holmstrom 
(1979), Lazear and Rosen (1981), and Grossman and Hart (1983) confirm agency costs 
are minimized by relating compensation to performance.  Alexander and Kern (2004), 
Scully (1974, 1989), Burger and Walters (2003), and Dobson and Goddard (1998) further 
show performance to be a significant determinant of sports franchise values.  




study, game performance, coaching performance, and recruiting performance are 
variables utilized to measure performance. 
Instinctively, a higher performing university football program, as measured by an 
increase in the number of wins, will produce more revenues and therefore increase the 
programs value.  Therefore, a university seeking to increase the value of their football 
program should seek to increase the number of wins.  This has been shown by Alexander 
and Kern (2004), Scully (1974, 1989), Burger and Walters (2003), and Dobson and 
Goddard (1998).   Alexander and Kern (2004) illustrates there is a significant positive 
relationship between game performance and the value of a NFL franchise.  Additional 
studies by Scully (1974, 1989), Burger and Walters (2003), Dobson and Goddard (1998) 
further indicate game performance is positively correlated with franchise value.  Clement 
and McCormick (1989) and Hadley et.al (2000) show coaching performance and 
efficiency is a significant factor and positively related to performance.  In fact, Hadley 
et.al (2000), demonstrates on average an efficient NFL coach can account for four to five 
additional wins per season.  In a season with roughly 16 games (not including playoffs), 
an efficient coach can account for upwards of 25% of the team’s wins.  This is a 
significant increase in performance, and further evidence that a quality coach is a 
significant factor in game performance.  It is therefore expected that as game 
performance improves, maximum compensation should also increase.  As a result, game 
performance variables are included in the model for maximum compensation.  Game 






   
Closely related to game performance is a head football coach’s recruiting 
performance.  DuMond et al. (2008) presents a detailed review of the literature on the 
importance of recruiting.  NCAA FBS head football coaches are the key recruiters for 
their respective universities.  Their purpose is to recruit the best and most talented group 
of players possible, thus increasing their ability to win football games.  Talent has been 
shown to be a key indicator of a team’s performance.   Many studies, such as Berri 
(1999), Hadley et al (2000), and the 2002 book by Bill James entitled “Win Shares,” have 
measured a player’s contribution to team performance in number of wins.  These studies 
show the better the player is, the more he contributes to the performance of the team.  
Due to the findings of these studies, it is expected that as recruiting performance 
improves so should the maximum compensation. 
One difference between this study and previously mentioned studies is that they 
focus on player contribution in professional sports markets and determine the level of 
compensation the player should receive based on his contribution to the performance of 
the team.  Due to NCAA rules, acquiring talent for university athletics is different in 
many ways to acquiring talent in professional athletics as well as for corporate 
organizations.  Universities are only allowed to offer four year scholarships providing 
food, lodging and education to student athletes.  No other monetary compensation or 
perquisite compensation can be paid to any student athlete.   
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Dumond, Lynch and Platania (2008) develop a probit model to predict the school 
a football recruit is most likely to attend.  Their model indicates a recruit’s decision to 
attend a particular university is a combination of distance from home, program 
performance, and academic rank.  However, Dumond, Lynch and Platania (2008) do not 
differentiate recruits based on their level of talent.  It can be argued the higher a recruit’s 
talent, the higher the probability he plays professional football beyond college, and 
therefore the recruit may place more emphasis on quality coaching when determining his 
choice of university.  It is therefore essential that a coach has the ability to recruit the 
most talented athletes without offering any compensation beyond a four year scholarship.   
He must be able to sell his program based on the university’s academics, past 
performance, and coaching ability.   
Recruiting is one area where agency problems arise.  In an attempt to attract more 
talented recruits, coaches often violate recruiting rules, such as contacting players outside 
of official recruiting periods, providing perquisites that are not afforded normal students, 
or in some cases compensating the recruit with large sums of money.  University athletic 
programs are often placed on probation by the NCAA for recruiting violations executed 
by their athletic coaches.  These are often minor violations leading to the suspension of a 
particular player for a few games or a season, reduction of one or two scholarships, or a 
reduction in the number of official recruiting visits a university can utilize.  However, 
some violations are more serious in nature, which lead to serious penalties including 
elimination of the program.
32
  Recently, the University of Southern California (USC) was 
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found guilty of serious recruiting violations in their football, basketball and tennis 
programs.  As a result of these violations, the NCAA has vacated all football wins in 
which Reggie Bush participated in (including the 2004 BCS National Championship 
game), banned USC from participating in post season bowl games for the next two years 
(essentially removing all chances at a national championship), and revoked 10 
scholarships for each of the next three recruiting classes (30 total scholarships).  Pundits 
have indicated that the ramifications of these violations will continue to be felt at USC 
for years to come.  This perennial powerhouse football program may have been relegated 
to the middle of the pack for many years.  It is interesting to note that Pete Carroll, the 
head coach during the period in which the violations occurred, exercised a buyout clause 
from his contract and is now the head coach for the NFL’s Seattle Seahawks.  It is 
apparent these recruiting violations assisted Pete Carroll in achieving his personal goals, 
but were detrimental to the goals of USC’s program. 
To better understand the effect of recruiting performance, three measures are 
examined: current year ranking, current year average stars, and the current year points.  
Lagged rank, lagged average stars, and lagged points as well as moving average for two, 
three and four years are also calculated.  All of these measures are found to be highly 
correlated; therefore, current year rank, average stars and points are used to as measure of 
recruiting performance.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“death penalty” and not allowed to participate in NCAA sanctioned football for the 1987 season.  
Additionally, SMU’s football program received a two year ban from bowl appearances and television, a 
limit of seven game for the 2008 season (all road games), loss of three assistant coaching positions for two 
years, and the loss of 55 scholarships over four years.  From 1980-1985 Southern Methodist University was 




Section 4.2.1.3 Multivariate Tests: Discussion of Variables: Coaching Tenure 
Experience or tenure of a head coach is a factor which should be considered when 
modeling maximum compensation.  An increase in the head coach’s total career 
performance and university career is, the longer the length of his career tenure and 
university tenure will be.  Studies such as Jones and Walsh (1988), and Hadley et al 
(2000) show tenure to be an indicator of head coaching efficiency and experience, and 
find tenure is positively correlated with performance.  Career tenure and university tenure 
variables are included in the models and are expected to be positively correlated with 
maximum compensation. 
Section 4.2.1.4 Multivariate Tests: Discussion of Variables: Succession 
Previous studies indicate that managerial succession effects team performance; 
therefore, succession variables are included in the models.  Grusky (1963, 1964) found 
that managers are more likely dismissed when teams performed poorly, yet upon 
dismissal team performance deteriorates even further.  Audas, Dobson, and Goddard 
(2002) find teams who lose their manager mid-season under-perform over the remainder 
of the season.  Gamson and Scotch (1964), Fizel and D’Itri (1997), Fizel et. Al. (1990), 
Dyl (1988) and many other studies find significant changes in performance due to 
managerial succession.   
Circumstances surrounding the replacement of the previous head coach could 
potentially have a bearing on the level of maximum compensation the new head coach 




coach.  The university may replace the previous head coach due to poor performance or 
due to a violation of the university head coach contract.  The head football coach may 
have exercised the buyout option either to retire from coaching or to accept another 
position.  These reasons may lead to significant changes in maximum compensation as 
outlined in the future head coach’s contract.   
A circumstance where a university decides to exercise the option to terminate the 
contract of their previous head coach without cause may signal their intent to improve the 
performance of the university football program.   If this is the case, the university will 
seek a head coach they feel will improve the performance of their football program.  
Therefore, the total maximum compensation in the new contract is expected to increase.   
 If the head coach exercises the option to buy out the remaining term of the 
contract, this does not signal the university’s intent to improve the performance of their 
football program.  In this situation, the university has a decision to make regarding the 
direction they take their football program.  Many universities are content with their 
football program’s current level of performance.  A university attempting to maintain the 
status quo will hire a head football coach on par with the previous head coach and 
maximum compensation under the new university head coaching employment agreement 
is expected to remain the same.  However, a university intent on improving their football 
program will seek to replace the previous head coach with a coach they feel will improve 
the performance of their football program.  In this case, the maximum compensation 
under the new university head coach’s contract should increase.  If the head coach 
exercises the buyout option, it can be anticipated the university will increase the 




the new head coach remaining with the university.  
Dummy variables are utilized in the models to control for circumstances of the 
succession event including whether the university exercised the option to fire the head 
coach or if the head coach exercised the option to buy out the remaining term of the 
employment agreement, whether the previous head coach became the head coach for 
another university, and whether the previous head coach left to coach in the NFL.   
Circumstances surrounding the university’s hiring of the new head football coach 
could also have a bearing on the level of maximum compensation offered in the new 
university head coach contract and may also take various forms.  The university may seek 
to hire an experienced head coach who is currently the head coach of another football 
program.  If this is the case, the university must lure the head coach from his current 
position, leading to an increase in maximum compensation.   
The university may also hire a new head coach with previous head coaching 
experience, that was fired from his previous university.  Under this circumstance no 
assumptions are made in regarding to the reason for the firing, whether for poor 
performance, or for violating terms of the head coach contract.  Such was the case with 
Boston College’s head coach, Jeff Jagadowski.  Boston College fired Jagadowski for 
interviewing for the head football coach vacancy with the NFL’s New York Jets.  
According to the athletic director, this was in violation of the university head coaching 
employment agreement which indicated all interviews must be pre-approved by the 
university.  In this case, the head coach, Jeff Jagadowski, asked permission, and was 




to his dismissal at Boston College.   
Finally, the university may also hire a new head coach with previous head 
coaching experience in the NFL.  There are a number of university head football coaches 
who have been head coaches the NFL.  Regardless of the circumstances behind the 
decision to return to coaching at the collegiate level, NFL head coaching experience is a 
strong signal of quality.  If this truly is a signal of quality, it is expected this should 
significantly increase the level of maximum compensation in the university head coach 
contracts.   
The models utilize dummy variables to control for circumstances that potentially 
have a bearing on the level of total maximum compensation offered in the new 
employment agreement.  These dummy variables control for hiring a new head coach 
with previous head coaching experience, hiring a new head coach away from the same 
position at another university, having a new head coach that was fired or voluntarily 
resigned from his previous employment, and hiring a coach that has previous experience 
as a head coach in the NFL. 
4.2.2 Multivariate Tests: Research Hypotheses 
Based on the preceding discussion, the following research hypotheses are tested as a part 




Hypothesis I:  A university head coach’s maximum compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to a head football coach’s tenure.
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Hypothesis II:  A university head coach’s guaranteed compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the head football coach’s tenure.   
Hypothesis III:  A university head coach’s maximum compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the performance of the university football program.   
Hypothesis IV:  A university head coach’s guaranteed compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the performance of the university football program.   
Hypothesis V:  A university head coach’s maximum compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the size of the university.   
Hypothesis VI:  A university head coach’s guaranteed compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the size of the university.   
Hypothesis VII: A head football coach’s maximum compensation is positively related to 
whether he voluntarily resigned from his previous position (either from another 
university or the NFL) to become the university’s head coach.   
Hypothesis VIII: A new head football coach’s maximum compensation is hypothesized to 
be higher if the university enters the search for a new head coach due to the voluntary 
resignation of their previous head coach.  
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 Note:  Maximum compensation is measured as the sum of guaranteed salary and the maximum bonus 





4.2.3 Multivariate Tests: Maximum Compensation: Models and Results 
Using variables described in the previous sections, eight models are developed to 
test the determinants of maximum compensation.   
4.2.3.1 Multivariate Tests: Maximum Compensation: Models and Results: Models 
1.1 and 1.2 
Models 1.1 and 1.2 examine the determinants of head football coach 
compensation.  Section 4.2.1 describes the variables that are tested to determine whether 
they are significant determinants of a head coach’s compensation. 
Models 1.1 and 1.2 are defined as 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2reci,t +  β4careeri,t +β5perwini,t +             (1.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2reci,t-1 +  β4careeri,t +β5perwini,t +              (1.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
where comp is the dependent variable describing the level of maximum compensation for 
an NCAA FBS head coach, rev is the university’s current year football revenues and 
measures both size and game performance, rec is the university’s current year recruiting 
points and measures recruiting performance, career is the length of the head football 
coach’s career, perwin is the head football coach’s career winning percentage, X1 is a 
dummy variable controlling whether the previous head coach was fired or voluntarily 
resigned, X2 is a dummy variable controlling whether the previous head coach left to be 
the head coach of another university, X3 is a dummy variable controlling whether the 




whether the current head coach was hired from within the university, X5  is a dummy 
variable controlling whether the current coach was fired or voluntarily retired from his 
previous position, X6  is a dummy variable controlling whether the current coach has 
previous head coaching experience, and X7 is a dummy variable controlling whether the 
current head coach has previous NFL head coaching experience. 
 The results for Model 1.1 and 1.2 can be seen in Table 4.1.  Model 1.1 uses 
current year university football revenues as a measure of both size and performance, and 
current year recruiting points as a measure of recruiting performance.  Multiple studies 
sight potential endogeneity and simultaneity issues when modeling compensation.  These 
arguments can be observed when performance is a determinant of compensation as is the 
case with head coach contracts.   
Model 1.2 seeks to eliminate potential endogeneity between the performance 
variables and maximum compensation by using lagged revenues and lagged recruiting 
points.  Using lagged performance variables should reduce the potential endogeneity, as 
the assumption can be made that last year’s revenues and last year’s recruiting 
performance is not a function of this year’s maximum compensation.  Attempts were 
made to use instrumental variable methodology similar to Adams and Ferriera (2007) but 
a strong instrumental variable could not be determined.   
Model 1.1 and 1.2 are estimated using both random effects and fixed effects to 
control for endogenity due to potential omitted variables.  Results are included in Table 
4.1.  Hausman tests are run to determine whether there is a significant difference in the 
random effects estimates and fixed effects estimates.  When there is not a significant 




If a significant difference exists between the estimates, fixed effects should be used to 
reduce omitted variable bias, keeping in mind fixed effects is not efficient.   
Model 1.1 indicates random effect estimates are both accurate and efficient while 
Model 1.2 indicates fixed effects estimates are necessary to reduce the bias due to 
omitted variables.   Results of Model 1.1 and Model 1.2 indicate that maximum 
compensation, determined by a head coach’s contract, is positively and significantly (1% 
level) related to university revenues and lagged revenues. This evidence supports 
Hypotheses III and V which states, maximum compensation is positively related to both 
size and game performance.  Maximum compensation is not significantly related to 
recruiting performance as measured by recruiting points (Model 1.1); but is significant 
and positively (10% level) related using lagged recruiting points (Model 1.2).  Model 1.1 
indicates that maximum compensation is significant and positively related to career 
tenure (10% level) as well as career winning percentage (1% level).  Model 1.2 estimates 
are determined using fixed effects which are not as powerful as random effects.  
Therefore, it is not surprising to find in Model 1.2 maximum compensation is not 
significantly related to career tenure but is positive and significantly related to career 
winning percentage (5% level).  Model 1.1 results are consistent with Hypothesis I and 
Hypothesis III stating that maximum compensation is positively related to both career 
tenure and performance.  Models 1.1 and 1.2 both find that maximum compensation is 
not significantly related to most succession events, previous head coaching experience, or 
being hired from within the university.  Model 1.1 and 1.2 do find support for Hypothesis 




compensation if the former head football coach exercises the option to buy out the 
remaining term of the employment agreement and become the head coach in the NFL).     
 The results for Model 1.1 indicate the following adjustments to maximum 
compensation.  For every $1,000 increase in revenues, maximum compensation increases 
$31.76.  As head coaching career tenure increases by one year and career winning 
percentage increases by one percent, maximum compensation increase $9,786 and 
$7,073, respectively.  Lastly, if the university’s previous head coach exercises his buyout 
option and becomes an NFL head coach, the maximum compensation paid to his 
successor increases $228,199.   
   Results for Model 1.2 indicate the following adjustments to maximum 
compensation.  For every $1,000 increase in lagged revenues, maximum compensation 
increases $35.64.  Further, for every one percent increase in a head coach’s career 
winning percent, maximum compensation increases $6,967.  Model 1.2 further finds that 
as lagged recruiting points increase by 1 point, maximum compensation decreases 
$96.19.  Finally, if the university’s previous head coach exercises his buyout option and 
becomes an NFL head coach, the maximum compensation paid to his successor increases 
$305,910.   
4.2.3.2 Multivariate Tests: Maximum Compensation: Models and Results: Models 
2.1 and 2.2  
Models 2.1 and 2.2 replaces the revenue variables with university’s endowment, 
one year lagged endowment, attendance and lagged attendance.
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 As previously indicated, revenues can be a measure for size and for game performance.  Models 1.1 and 
1.2, determine that maximum compensation is positively related to revenues and one year lagged revenues.  




Model 2.1 and 2.2 are defined as 
compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3reci,t-1 + β4careeri,t + β5perwini,t + (2.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3reci,t-1 + β4careeri,t + β5perwini,t+ (2.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
where endow is the university’s current endowment, att is the university’s current 
average game attendance and all other variables are the same as for Models 1.1 and 1.2.  
Lagged performance variables are utilized in Models 2.1 and 2.2 in an attempt to 
minimize endogeneity, as well as using both random effects and fixed effects.  Results of 
both estimations are included in Table 4.2.     
Both Model 2.1 and Model 2.2 indicate fixed effects estimates are not necessary 
and random effect estimates are both accurate and efficient based on the Hausman tests.   
Results explaining the significance of size as a determinant of maximum compensation 
are inconsistent between Models 2.1 and 2.2.  Model 2.1 indicates maximum 
compensation is not significantly related to current year endowment whereas Model 2.2 
supports Hypothesis V indicating maximum compensation is positively and significantly 
(1% level) related to size, as measured by one year lagged endowment.   Models 2.1 and 
2.2 results show maximum compensation is positively and significantly (1% level) 
related to game performance, as measured by attendance and lagged attendance.  These 
findings are consistent with Hypothesis III.  Again, Models 2.1 and 2.2 indicate 
maximum compensation is not significantly related to recruiting performance, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
differentiate between size effect and performance, revenues and one year lagged revenues are replaced with 
endowment and one year lagged endowment, to measure size effect, and attendance and one year lagged 





measured by a university’s current recruiting points and lagged recruiting points.  Model 
2.1 does not find maximum compensation to be significantly related to career winning 
percent, but finds that maximum compensation is positive and significantly related to 
career tenure.  Model 2.2 does establish that maximum compensation is positive and 
significantly related to career head coaching tenure as well as career winning percent, 
sustaining the theories behind Hypothesis I and III.   The models find no significant 
relationship between maximum compensation and previous head coaching experience, 
both collegiately and professionally.  However, both models indicate maximum 
compensation is negative and significantly related to the head coach being hired from 
within the university football program.  The models do not uncover any significant 
evidence surrounding the university entering the market for a new head football coach 
and compensation.  These findings are inconsistent with Hypothesis VIII and IX. 
 The results for Model 2.1 indicate the following. For every one person increase in 
attendance, maximum compensation increases $21.90.  Further, as career tenure increases 
by one year, maximum compensation increases $13,280.  Lastly, if the university hires 
from within, maximum compensation decreases $142,406. 
   The results for Model 2.2 indicate the following: for every $1,000 increase in 
lagged university endowment, maximum compensation increases $0.13.  For every one 
person increase in lagged attendance, maximum compensation increases $22.47.    As 
career tenure increases one year and career winning percent increases one percent, 
maximum compensation increases $11,958 and $5,684, respectively.  Model 2.2 also 





4.2.3.3 Multivariate Tests: Maximum Compensation: Models and Results: Models 
3.1 and 3.2 
Possible multicollinearity issues exist regarding recruiting measurement.  
Variables capturing recruiting performance are subjective opinions of those employed by 
Rivals.  Many believe because Rivals business is selling information and subscriptions to 
university football fans, perhaps results are biased toward larger more popular schools.  
Favorable results for large universities with large fan support can possibly lead to 
increased subscriptions and increased revenues.  The high correlation between recruiting 
rank and attendance or revenues lends support to the multicollinearity argument.  
However, it is impossible to determine whether they provide an unbiased opinion on 
recruiting, or if in fact it is biased.  In order to remove this potential bias, Models 3.1 and 
3.2 drop recruiting performance from the analysis. 
 Models 3.1 and 3.2 are defined as   
compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2careeri,t + β3perwini,t + βm X1i,1+ (3.1) 
βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2careeri,t + β3perwini,t + βm X1i,1+  (3.2) 
βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
where all the variables are consistent with those defined in Models 1.1 and 1.2. 
The results from Models 3.1 and 3.2 are presented in Table 4.3.  Similar to 
previous models, lagged performance variables as well as random effects and fixed 
effects are again utilized to minimize potential endogeneity issues.   Hausman tests are 




estimates and fixed effects estimates.  The results of these tests indicate that random 
effect estimates are both accurate and efficient.   
Models 3.1 and 3.2 also use current year university football revenues as a measure 
of both size and performance, and current year recruiting points as a measure of 
recruiting performance.  The results indicate maximum compensation is positively (1% 
significance levels) and significantly related to revenues and lagged revenues.  This lends 
further credence to Hypotheses I and III, which state maximum compensation is 
positively related to university size and performance.  Model 3.1 indicates maximum 
compensation is not significantly related to career head coaching tenure but maximum 
compensation is positively and significantly (1% significance level) related to career 
winning percentage.  Model 3.2 specifies that maximum compensation is positively and 
significantly related (1% significance level) to career tenure and career winning 
percentage, further supporting Hypotheses I and III.  The models uncover no significant 
relationship between previous head coaching experience and maximum compensation.  
Model 3.1 does not find maximum compensation to be significantly related to the 
university hiring a new head coach from within the university, yet Model 3.2 finds a 
significant and negative relationship (10% significance level).  Model 3.1 also supports 
Hypothesis VIII by finding that maximum compensation is expected to increase when the 
previous head football coach exercises his option to buy out the remaining term of his 
employment agreement.  Model 3.2 does not find any significance surrounding the 
university entering the market for a new head football coach.  
Results for Model 3.1 indicate the following economic relationships. For every 




coach’s career winning percent increases by one percent, maximum compensation is 
expected to increase $7,256.  Lastly, if the university’s previous head coach exercises his 
buyout option to become an NFL head coach, maximum compensation paid to his 
successor is expected to increase by $232,865.   
 The results for Model 3.2 indicate the following: for every $1,000 increase in 
lagged football revenues, maximum compensation increases $28.12.  As career 
experience increases one year and career winning percentage increases by one percent, 
maximum compensation is expected to increase $7,256 and $7,159, respectively.  The 
results also indicate that  if the university hires from within to fill the vacant head 
coaching position, maximum compensation decreases $125,104.   
4.2.3.4 Multivariate Tests: Maximum Compensation: Models and Results: Models 
4.1 and 4.2 
Models 4.1 and 4.2 separate size and performance effects as well as drop 
recruiting performance to remove potential multicollinearity issues. 
 Models 4.1 and 4.2are defined as   
compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3careeri,t + β4perwini,t +  (4.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3careeri,t + β4perwini,t +  (4.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 
where all the variables are consistent with those defined in Models 2.1 and 2.2. 
Both Model 4.1 and Model 4.2 indicate random effect estimates are both accurate 
and efficient.   Similar to Models 2.1 and 2.2, the significance of size is inconsistent 




significantly related to current endowment whereas Model 4.2 is consistent with 
Hypothesis III, indicating maximum compensation is positively and significantly (1% 
significance level) related to lagged endowment, a measure of size.   Results illuminating 
maximum compensation’s relationship to game performance are consistent with 
Hypothesis V.  Model 4.1 indicates maximum compensation is positively and 
significantly related to current attendance,  lagged attendance and career tenure ( 1% 
significance level), but does not find maximum compensation to be significantly related 
to career winning percent.  However, Model 4.2 does establish that maximum 
compensation is positively and significantly related to career head tenure and career 
winning percent, again supporting Hypothesis I and III.   Models 4.1 and 4.2 find 
maximum compensation is not significantly related to previous head coaching 
experience, but is negatively and significantly related to whether the university hired 
from within the football program.  Furthermore, these models do not find any significant 
relationship surrounding maximum compensation and why the university entered the 
market for a new head football coach. 
 The results for Model 4.1 indicate the following adjustments to maximum 
compensation.  For every increase in attendance, maximum compensation increases 
$23.86, and as career tenure increases by one year, maximum compensation increases 
$12,889.  Lastly, if the university hires their new head coach from within, maximum 
compensation is expected to decrease by $154,720. 
 The results for Model 4.2 indicate the following adjustments to the average 
maximum compensation.  For every $1,000 increase in lagged university endowment, the 




lagged attendance, maximum compensation increases $22.32.    As career experience and 
career winning percentage increase, maximum compensation increases $16,610 and 
$5,432, respectively.  Model 4.2 also finds if the university hires a new head coach from 
within, the current football program maximum compensation will decrease $194,582. 
 To summarize the results for Models 1 through 4, the multivariate models utilized 
to ascertain the significant factors determining maximum compensation provided by  
university head coaching employment agreements demonstrates strong evidence that 
maximum compensation is a function of size, performance, career tenure, career winning 
percent, and hiring the new head coach from within the university.   
4.2.4 Multivariate Tests:  Guaranteed Compensation: Model and Results 
 The previous section examined the determinants of maximum compensation.  
Maximum compensation is classified as either guaranteed compensation or performance 
based incentives.  This section discusses the results of the multivariate tests examining 
which variables determine the level of guaranteed compensation.  A key objective of a 
head coach’s contract is to create a compensation package that aligns the goals of the 
principle and the agent, thus minimizing agency costs.  Studies by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), Harder (1992), Brown (1994) Mehran (1995), and Berri and Krautmann (2006) 
examine the effects incentives have on performance.  The models examining the 
determinants of a university head coaching contract’s guaranteed compensation utilize 
many of the same variables as the models employed to estimate the determinants of 




4.2.4.1 Multivariate Tests:  Guaranteed Compensation: Model and Results: Models 
5.1 and 5.2 
Using many of the same variables as the first four models, Models 5.1 and 5.2 are 
developed to estimate the significant determinants of guaranteed compensation.   
Models 5.1 and 5.2 are defined as 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2reci,t + β3hcagei,t+ β4univtenurei,t  (5.1) 
+ β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t  
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2reci,t-1 + β3hcagei,t + β4univtenurei,t  (5.2) 
+ β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1  + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t  
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 
where univtenure is the length of a coach’s tenure as the university’s head football coach, 
wini,t-1  is the number of wins for the football program in the previous season, hcage is the 
coach’s age – career tenure, and all other variables are consistent with those defined in 
previous models.  Similar methods are used to control for endogeneity and simultaneity 
as in the previous models for Models 5.1 and 5.2.   
Table 5.1 presents the results for Model 5.1 and 5.2.  The results indicate that 
fixed effects estimates are not necessary and random effect estimates are both accurate 
and efficient and that guaranteed compensation is not significantly related to current 
revenues.  These results are inconsistent with Hypothesis IV and VI, indicating that a 
coach’s guaranteed compensation is not related to size or performance as measured by 
current revenues or lagged revenues.  Furthermore, Model 5.1 indicates guaranteed 




5.2 finds evidence that guaranteed compensation is positively and significantly (1% level) 
related to lagged recruiting performance.  Both models also reveal the following: 
guaranteed compensation is positive and significantly (1% and 10% levels for the 
models, respectively) related to head coaching age, guaranteed compensation is positive 
and significantly (1% level) related to university tenure, guaranteed compensation is 
positive and significantly related to career winning percentage (1% level and 5% level), 
and guaranteed compensation is not significantly related to previous head coaching 
experience.  Tenure results are consistent with Hypothesis II and winning percent results 
support Hypothesis IV.  The models uncover evidence that guaranteed compensation is 
negative and significantly (1% level) related to whether the university hires their new 
head coach from within the football program, but guaranteed compensation is not 
significantly related to circumstances leading the university to enter the market for a new 
head football coach.    
 The results for Model 5.1 indicate the following adjustments to guaranteed 
compensation.  As head coaching age increases, guaranteed compensation increases on 
average 0.33%.  As university tenure increases, guaranteed compensation increases 
0.59% and career winning percentage increases, guaranteed compensation increases 
0.27%.  Finally, if the new head coach is hired from within the current football program, 
guaranteed compensation decreases by 10.37%.   
Results for Model 5.2 can be interpreted as follows.  For every one percent 
increase in lagged recruiting performance, guaranteed compensation increases by 
0.003%.  Further as head coaching age increases by one year, guaranteed compensation 




increases 0.71%.  Additionally, Model 5.2 indicates as career winning percent increases 
by one percent, the guaranteed compensation will increase 0.19%.  Finally, if the new 
head coach is hired from within the current football program, guaranteed compensation 
decreases by 9.91%.   
4.2.4.2 Multivariate Tests:  Guaranteed Compensation: Model and Results: Models 
6.1 and 6.2 
Models 6.1 and 6.2 replace revenues and one year lagged revenues with university 
endowment, attendance, lagged endowment, and lagged attendance in order to separately 
measure size effects and performance effects.  Models 6.1 and 6.2 control for 
endogeneity and simultaneity and are defined as  
 guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3reci,t + β4hcagei,t + β4univtenurei,t  (6.1) 
+ β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t  
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3reci,t-1 + β4hcagei,t + β4univtenurei,t  (6.2) 
+ β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t  
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
where all variables are the consistent with previous models. 
Models 6.1 and 6.2 indicate fixed effects estimates are not necessary and random 
effect estimates are both accurate and efficient.  The results indicate that guaranteed 
compensation is not significantly related to endowment, attendance, lagged endowment, 
and lagged attendance, which do not support Hypothesis VI and Hypothesis IV.  
Furthermore, both models designate that guaranteed compensation is not significantly 
related to recruiting performance and lagged recruiting performance.  Model 6.1 indicates 




coaching age, yet Model 6.2 indicates no significant relationship.  Moreover, both models 
provide evidence that guaranteed compensation is positive and significantly related (1% 
level) to university tenure, as well as career winning percentage, at a 5% level of 
significance.  Both models also show that guaranteed compensation is not significantly 
related to a head coach’s previous employment except for when a new head coach is 
hired from within the university, in which guaranteed compensation is shown to be 
negative and significant (1% level).  The models also indicate that guaranteed 
compensation is related to circumstances surrounding a university’s search for a new 
head coach.  Guaranteed compensation is found to be negative and significantly (1% 
level and 10% level) related to the previous head coach exercising his buyout option and 
voluntarily resigning as the university’s head coach.  Tenure results are consistent with 
Hypothesis II, winning percentage results support Hypothesis IV, and buyout results 
support Hypothesis VIII. 
 The results for Model 6.1 can be interpreted in the following ways.  As head 
coaching age increases by one year, guaranteed compensation will increase by 0.20%; as 
university tenure increases by one year, guaranteed compensation also increases 0.75%; 
and as a head coach’s career winning percentage increases by one percent, guaranteed 
compensation increases by 0.19%.  Model 6.1 also shows strong evidence indicating if 
the previous head coach exercises his buyout option, there is a 3.15% point reduction in 
guaranteed compensation in the new employment agreement.  Finally, if the new coach is 
hired from within the university’s football program, guaranteed compensation decreases 




Results for Model 6.2 also indicate the following findings.  As university tenure 
increases, the guaranteed compensation increases by 0.81% and  as career winning 
percentage increases by one percent, guaranteed compensation increases 0.17%.  The 
results also show that when the previous head coach exercises his buyout option, this 
leads to a 3.24% reduction in guaranteed compensation.  Finally, if the university 
replaces the previous head coach with someone from within the university’s football 
program, guaranteed compensation decreases by 9.80%.   
4.2.4.3 Multivariate Tests:  Guaranteed Compensation: Model and Results: Models 
7.1 and 7.2 
Similar to Models 3.1 and 3.2, recruiting variables are removed from Models 7.1 
and 7.2.  Models 7.1 and 7.2 are also developed to estimate the significant determinants 
of guaranteed compensation and use variables from the first four models. The models use 
university football revenues as a measure of size and performance, as well as current year 
recruiting points as a measure of recruiting performance.  Possible endogeneity and 
spontaneity concerns are mitigated by running both random and fixed effects as well as 
utilizing lagged performance variables.  
Models 7.1 and 7.2 are defined as 
guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2compi,t+ β3careertenurei,t + β4univtenurei,t 
  + β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1+βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t (7.1) 
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2compi,t+ β3careertenurei,t + β4univtenurei,t  
 + β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +  (7.2) 





where all variables are consistent with those defined in previous models.  Results for 
Models 7.1 and 7.2 are found in Table 5.3.   
Hausman test results indicate the fixed effects estimates for the models are not 
necessary and random effect estimates are both accurate and efficient.  Both models 
reveal the following: guaranteed compensation is positive and significantly (1% and 5% 
levels, respectively) related to head coaching age, university tenure is positively and 
significantly (1% level) related, and positive and significantly (1% level) related to career 
winning percentage.  Guaranteed compensation was not found to be significantly related 
to previous head coaching experience, but the models do show evidence that guaranteed 
compensation is negative and significantly related to whether the new head coach is hired 
from within the university’s current football program.  The models fail to provide 
evidence suggesting guaranteed compensation is significantly related to circumstances 
surrounding the university entering the market for a new head football coach.  Tenure 
results are consistent with Hypothesis II and winning percentage results support 
Hypothesis IV. 
 Results for Model 7.1 indicate the following adjustments to guaranteed 
compensation provided by university head coaching contracts.  As head coaching age 
increases by one year, guaranteed compensation will also increase by 0.39%; as 
university tenure increases by one year, guaranteed compensation increases 0.56%; and 
as career winning percentage increases by one percent, guaranteed compensation will 
increase by 0.29%.  Lastly, if the university hires their new head coach from within the 
current university football program, guaranteed compensation under the new head 




The results for Model 7.2 can be interpreted in the following manner.  As head 
coaching age increases by one year, guaranteed compensation decreases 0.25%; as 
university tenure increases by one year, guaranteed compensation increases 0.67%; and 
as the career winning percentage increases by one percent, guaranteed compensation 
increases 0.21%.  Finally, if the university hires their new head coach from within the 
current university football program, guaranteed compensation under the new head 
coach’s contract will decreases 10.07%.   
4.2.4.4 Multivariate Tests:  Guaranteed Compensation: Model and Results: 
Models 8.1 and 8.2 
Models 8.1 and 8.2 replace revenues and one year lagged revenues with 
endowment, one year lagged endowment, attendance, and lagged attendance in order to 
separately measure size and performance.  Models 8.1 and 8.2 control for endogeneity 
and simultaneity and are defined as  
guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3compi,t+ β4careertenurei,t + β5univtenurei,t  
 + β6perwini,t + β7wini,t-1+ βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t (8.1) 
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3compi,t+ β4careertenurei,t + β5univtenurei,t  
 + β6perwini,t + β7wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t (8.2) 
+βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
where all variables are the consistent with previous models. 
The models indicate fixed effects estimates are not necessary and random effect 
estimates are both accurate and efficient.  Results from both models indicate that 
guaranteed compensation is not significantly related to endowment, attendance, lagged 




Hypothesis IV.  Furthermore, Model 8.1 indicates that guaranteed compensation is 
positive and significantly related (10% level) to head coaching age, however this result in 
Model 8.2 is not significant.  University tenure and career winning percentage are both 
significantly and positively related to guaranteed compensation in both models. Both 
models also show that guaranteed compensation is not significantly related to a head 
coach’s previous employment except for when a new head coach is hired from within the 
university, where guaranteed compensation is shown to be negative and significantly (1% 
level) related.  Both models also indicate that guaranteed compensation is related to 
circumstances surrounding a university’s search for a new head coach.  Guaranteed 
compensation is found to be negative and significantly (1% level and 10% level) related 
to the previous head coach exercising his buyout option and voluntarily resigning as the 
university’s head coach.  Tenure results are consistent with Hypothesis II, winning 
percentage results support Hypothesis IV, and buyout results support Hypothesis VIII. 
The results for Model 8.1 can be interpreted as follows:  as head coaching age 
increases, guaranteed compensation decreases 0.23%, as university tenure increases, 
guaranteed compensation increases 0.72%, as career winning percentage increases then 
guaranteed compensation increases 0.20%, and finally, if the new head coach is hired 
from within the university’s football program, guaranteed compensation decreases 
9.57%.   
Results for Model 8.2 indicate the following findings.  As university tenure 
increases, guaranteed compensation increases 0.76%, as career winning percentage 




hired from within the university’s football program, guaranteed compensation decreases 
9.79%.   
Summary for all models:  Overall, the results for all models demonstrate strong 
evidence that guaranteed compensation is a function of performance (Hypothesis IV and 
Hypothesis II), university tenure, career winning percentage (Hypothesis IV), and 
whether the university hired from within.  There is no consistent evidence to indicate that 
guaranteed compensation is a function of size (Hypothesis VI), previous experience 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation examined the contracts for NCAA FBS head football coaches in 
order to gain insight and understanding into the determinants of maximum compensation 
and guaranteed compensation.  The results of this study of head football coach’s contracts 
should also shed light on some of the possible determinants of corporate executive 
compensation.  Next, each hypothesis is restated and a summary of the empirical findings 
is provided for key variables. 
5.1 Conclusions: Tenure 
Hypothesis I:  A university head coach’s maximum compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to a head football coach’s tenure.
35
   
The results of the univariate test support the premise of Hypothesis I.  Univariate 
test results determine there is a significant difference (1% level) for both the length of a 
NCAA Football Bowl Division head football coach’s career tenure as well as his 
university tenure, between high compensation agreements and low compensation 
agreements. 
Results of multivariate tests also find evidence to support Hypothesis I.  Models 
1.1 and 3.1 indicate maximum compensation is not significantly related to a head coach’s 
career tenure.  However there are potential endogeneity or simultaneity issues when using 
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current year performance variables.  Models 1.2 and 3.2 correct for this potential 
endogeneity issue by using one year lagged performance variables.  After correcting for 
the potential endogeneity, Model 1.2 indicates that maximum compensation is not 
significantly related to career tenure; however, Model 3.2 does indicate maximum 
compensation is positive and significantly related to career tenure.  Models 2 and 4 
results find maximum compensation to be positive and significantly related to career 
tenure.  Though not reported in this study these results are robust to the use of university 
tenure.   
The above results provide sufficient evidence to support Hypothesis I suggesting 
maximum compensation is positive and significantly related to a head coach’s career 
tenure.  
Hypothesis II:  A university head coach’s guaranteed compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the head football coach’s tenure.   
Multivariate results from Models 5 through 8 all show strong significance for the 
university tenure variable.  From this we can conclude that guaranteed compensation is 
positive and significantly related to a head coach’s tenure.  Intuition would suggest, as a 
head coach increases performance in the eyes of the university and the eyes of his 
profession (as signaled by the length of his career and tenure at the university), the less 
uncertainty the university and profession will have about his future performance; 
therefore, they do not need to provide as many incentive bonuses to insure his continued 




5.2 Conclusions: Performance 
Hypothesis III:  A university head coach’s maximum compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the performance of the university football program.   
Univariate test results show a significant difference between the coach’s 
university winning percentage, career winning percentage, number of career wins, 
recruiting points and average attendance, between high compensation contracts and low 
compensation contracts.  These results are consistent with the foundation of Hypothesis 
III: as university football program and head coach performance increases, head coaching 
maximum compensation as detailed within the contract will also increase.   
 Multivariate tests results lend further evidence that maximum compensation is 
positively related to an increase in university football program performance.  As a 
university’s football program increases performance there should be an accompanying 
increase in the head coach’s maximum compensation.  Models 1.1, 1.2, 3.1 and 3.2 
indicate maximum compensation is positively and significantly related to revenue and 
lagged revenue, both measures of performance.  Model 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, and 4.2 indicate 
maximum compensation is positively and significantly related to attendance and lagged 
attendance, also measures of performance.  Additionally, maximum compensation is 
found to be consistently significant and positively related to career winning percentage, 
another performance indicator.  Again these findings support the premise of Hypothesis 
III, that an increase in the performance of the university football program and the head 
coach leads to an increase in the maximum compensation of a head coach’s contract.  




similar results; concluding results are robust to the use of career winning percentage or 
university winning percentage. 
 Recruiting has been shown to be important to the performance of both a 
university’s football program and the head football coach; therefore, recruiting variables 
are included in Models 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2.  However, measurements of recruiting 
performance introduce potential biases and therefore are eliminated in Models 3.1, 3.2, 
4.1, and 4.2.  Results of Models 1.1, 1.2, 2.1 and 2.2 indicate maximum compensation is 
not significantly related to recruiting performance, as measured by recruiting points.  
Robustness tests, utilizing average stars as well as rank yielded similar results.     
 Maximum compensation was found to be significantly related to all performance 
variables, with the exception of recruiting.  Results support the foundation of Hypothesis 
III, that maximum compensation university football program and head coach 
performance is positively related to, as measured by revenue, lagged revenue, attendance, 
lagged attendance, and head coach’s career winning percentage,. 
Hypothesis IV:  A university head coach’s guaranteed compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the performance of the university football program.   
 Multivariate tests results conclude that guaranteed compensation is not 
significantly related to the performance of a university’s football program.  More 
specifically results of models 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, and 7.2 demonstrate guaranteed compensation 
is not significantly related to performance as measured by revenues and lagged revenues.  




significant determinant of a head coaching employment agreement’s guaranteed 
compensation.  Revenues measure both size effects and performance effects.  Models 6.1, 
6.2, 8.1, and 8.2 separate size and performance effects by utilizing endowment and 
lagged endowment as measures of size, while attendance and lagged attendance measure 
performance.  When size and performance effects are separated, as in Models 6.1, 6.2, 
8.1, and 8.2, results show that guaranteed compensation is not significantly related to 
performance as measured by attendance.   
Recruiting performance yields varied results.  Only Model 5.2 indicates 
guaranteed compensation is significantly related to the lagged recruiting performance.  
Models 5.1, 6.1, and 6.2 all indicate recruiting performance guaranteed compensation is 
not significantly related to recruiting and lagged recruiting performance.   
General results show a contract’s guaranteed compensation is not significantly 
related to revenues, lagged revenues, attendance, lagged attendance, recruiting and lagged 
recruiting.  These results do not support the underpinning of Hypothesis IV.  Further 
research into the relationship between guaranteed compensation and performance should 
be implemented. 
5.3 Conclusions: Size 
Hypothesis V:  A university head coach’s maximum compensation, as detailed in his 
contract, is positively related to the size of the university.   
Stadium capacity, endowment, lagged endowment, revenues, and lagged revenues 




and significant difference between the university’s stadium capacity, endowment, lagged 
endowment, revenues, and lagged revenues between high compensation agreements and 
low compensation agreements.  These results are consistent with the premise of 
Hypothesis V, stating a head coach’s maximum compensation is a significantly related to 
university size.   
 Multivariate models test the significance of size utilizing the variables -- 
revenues, lagged revenues, endowment, and lagged endowment.  Models 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 
and 3.2 utilize revenues as a proxy for size.  These models demonstrate maximum 
compensation is consistently found to be positive and significantly related to revenues 
and lagged revenues.  Models 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, and 4.2 utilize endowment and lagged 
endowment as proxies for size.  Results for Models 2.1 and 4.1 indicate maximum 
compensation is not significantly related to endowment; however, Models 2.2 and 4.2 
indicate maximum compensation is both positively and significantly related to lagged 
endowment.  Mixed results may be the consequence of endogeneity between endowment 
and maximum compensation.  Lagged endowment diminishes this endogeneity issue.   
Results from models 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, and 4.2 are consistent with the premise 
of Hypothesis V that maximum compensation is positively related to university size, 
suggesting the larger the university, the higher the head coach’s maximum compensation.  
Hypothesis VI:  A university head coach’s guaranteed compensation, as detailed in his 




 Multivariate models again test the relationship between size and guaranteed 
compensation, using revenues, lagged revenues, endowment, and lagged endowment as 
proxies for size.  Models 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 and 7.2 find guaranteed compensation is not 
significantly related to revenue and lagged revenue.  Models 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, and 8.2 replace 
revenues and lagged revenues with endowment and lagged endowment as proxies for 
size.  Results for Models 6.1, 6.2, and 8.1, 8.2 indicate that guaranteed compensation is 
not significantly related to endowment and lagged endowment.  However, results for 
Model 8.2 indicate that guaranteed compensation is negative and significantly related to 
endowment and lagged endowment.   
The multivariate model results are not sufficient to support Hypothesis VI 
suggesting guaranteed compensation is significantly related to university size.   
5.4 Conclusions: Succession 
Hypothesis VII: A head football coach’s maximum compensation is positively related to 
whether he voluntarily resigned from his previous position (either from another 
university or the NFL) to become the university’s head coach.   
 Univariate and multivariate test results do not contain sufficient evidence to 
support the premise that maximum compensation is significantly related to whether a 
head coach voluntarily resigns from their previous position or whether he was terminated.  




Hypothesis VIII: A new head football coach’s maximum compensation is positively 
related to whether the university enters the search for a new head coach due to the 
voluntary resignation of their previous head coach.  
 Univariate and multivariate test results do not contain sufficient evidence to 
support the premise that maximum compensation is significantly related to whether the 
university entered the labor market for a new head coach due to the voluntary resignation 
of the previous head coach or whether the university terminated the previous head 
coach’s contract, thus not supporting Hypothesis VIII.   
5.5 Conclusions: Other 
An additional finding from this dissertation is that when a university hires a new 
head coach from within the existing football program, there is a significant savings to the 
university both in terms of maximum compensation and also a reduction of the 
guaranteed compensation.  Each model consistently finds maximum compensation and 
guaranteed compensation are negative and significantly related to a university hiring their 
new head coach from within the existing football program. 
A further finding indicates that head coaching experience is a significant 
determinant of a head coach’s maximum compensation as well as his guaranteed 
compensation.  Models 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2 indicate that maximum 
compensation is positively related to a head coach’s career tenure.  This indicates that as 
a head coach’s career tenure increases, there will be an increase in his maximum 




8.2 indicate that a head coach’s guaranteed compensation is positive and significantly 
related to head coaching age and university tenure.  It can therefore be concluded that as 
a head coach’s tenure at a university increases, both his maximum compensation and his 
guaranteed compensation increases.  Likewise, both maximum compensation and 
guaranteed compensation are positively related to head coaching age.
36
   
5.6 Conclusions: Final Conclusions 
 This dissertation examined contracts for NCAA FBS head football coaches in 
order to investigate the determinants of both maximum compensation and guaranteed 
compensation in the market for head coaches.  Though the scope of this study examined 
NCAA FBS head football coaches, many of the relationships found may lead to a better 
understanding of top corporate executive compensation packages.  
For instance, this dissertation finds maximum compensation is positively related 
to the performance of a university’s football program and the head football coach.  This 
supports corporate compensation studies that find executive compensation to be positive 
and significantly related to the performance of a firm.   
Furthermore, this dissertation finds maximum compensation and guaranteed 
compensation to be positively related to the length of service career and university tenure.  
This result supports the findings of Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009), who show that 
uncertain relationships between a CEO and the firm are more likely to yield explicit 
contract agreements.  Similarly, the longer a head coach’s career and university tenure, 
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the less uncertainty about quality and performance.  This leads to an increase in 
maximum compensation and guaranteed compensation.   
Maximum compensation is found to be positively and significantly related to size.  
This supports previous findings indicating that executive compensation is positively 
related to the size of the firm.  However, this dissertation finds that guaranteed 
compensation is not significantly related to size.  Thus, we might speculate that 
guaranteed executive compensation is not positively related to firm size, but that other 
factors are more important in determining how much of an executives compensation is 
guaranteed.   
Finally a large portion of this dissertation was to examine Jensen, Murphy and 
Wruck’s first two critical dimensions of a remuneration package, utilizing NCAA 
Football Bowl Subdivision head football coach’s contracts.
37
  Addressing Jensen, 
Murphy and Wruck’s first critical dimension, this dissertation offers discernment into the 
configuration of NCAA FBS head coach’s contracts and  delivers insight into salary 
structure, performance incentives, non-performance incentives (perquisites), and 
termination and buyout agreements found within these contracts.   
Addressing Jensen, Murphy and Wruck’s second critical dimension, this 
dissertation provides understanding into the determinants of these contracts.  More 
specifically, it examines the determinants of a NCAA Football Bowl Division head 
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 Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck’s first two critical dimensions of a remuneration package are first, the total 
benefits associated with the job or position including the costs and benefits of non-pecuniary aspects of the 




coach’s maximum compensation, as well as the determinants of guaranteed 
compensation.    
This dissertation does not address Jensen, Murphy and Wruck’s third critical 
dimension, relating the compensation structure of these employment agreements to 
performance.  A natural extension of this dissertation is to examine the relationship of 
executive compensation and guaranteed compensation of NCAA FBS head coach’s 
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coach Name of NCAA head football coach 
age  Age of Coach during current contract year 
racew Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach is Caucasian, 0 if Coach is not 
Caucasian 
raceb Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach is African-American, 0 if 
Coach is not African-American 
raceo Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach is of any ethnicity other than 
Caucasian or African-American, 0 if Coach is Caucasian or 
African-American. 
yrsuniv Number of years Coach has been employed as the University’s 
head football coach. 
univw The total number of games the coach has won while employed by 
the University as the University’s head football coach. 
univl The total number of games the coach has lost while employed by 
the University as the University’s head football coach. 
perunivwin The coach’s percent wins out of games played while employed by 
the University as the University’s head football coach. 
yrscr The total number of years the coach has been employed as a head 
football coach by any NCAA Bowl Championship Division 
program. 
hcage This is calculated as the difference between a head coach’s age 









wcr The total number of career games the coach has won while 
employed as a head football coach by any NCAA Bowl 
Championship Division program. 
lcr The total number of career games the coach has lost while 
employed as a head football coach by any NCAA Bowl 
Championship Division program. 
percrwin The coach’s percent wins out of games played while employed as 
a head football coach by any NCAA Bowl Championship 
Division program. 
fvr Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach voluntarily left his previous 
job or came out of retirement to become the head coach for the 
current University’s football program, 0 if coach was fired from 
his previous job and become the head coach for the current 
University’s football program 
head Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach was the head coach at his 
previous employment position, 0 if Coach was not the head coach 
at his previous employment position 
nfl Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach was previously employed in 
the National Football League, 0 if Coach was not the previously 
employed in the National Football League 
within Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach was previously employed by 
the University in some other position, 0 if Coach was not 




univ  University employing Coach during current contract year 
conf  NCAA Bowl Championship Conference with which University is 
affiliated during current contract year 
big_12   Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the Big 










acc   Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the 
Atlantic Coast Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other 
Conference 
big_east   Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the Big 
East Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other Conference 
big_10 Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the Big 
10 Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other Conference 
cusa   Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with 
Conference USA and 0 if affiliated with any other Conference 
mac Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the Mid-
American Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other 
Conference 
mwc Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the 
Mountain West Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other 
Conference 
pac_10 Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the 
Pacific Athletic Conference 10 and 0 if affiliated with any other 
Conference 
sec Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the 
Southeastern Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other 
Conference 
sunbelt Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the 
SunBelt Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other Conference 
wac Dummy variable equals 1 if University is affiliated with the 
Western Athletic Conference and 0 if affiliated with any other 
Conference 
pfvr Dummy variable equals 1 if the University’s previous head 
football coach retired from coaching or voluntarily left to for a 
position in another football program, 0 if the University’s fired 













phead Dummy variable equals 1 if the University’s previous head 
football coach left to become the head coach for another football 
program, 0 if the University’s previous head football coach left to 
become the head coach for another football program 
pnfl Dummy variable equals 1 if the University’s previous head 
football coach Left to accept a position in the National Football 
League, 0 if the University’s previous head football coach did not 
leave to accept a position in the National Football League. 
stcap University’s football stadium capacity in the current year. 
endowt University’s current year endowment as reported by the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers Annual 
Endowment Study 
endowt-1 University’s previous year endowment as reported by the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers Annual 
Endowment Study 
revt Revenue generated in the current year by the University’s football 
program as reported by the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Equity in Athletics Database 
(http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/GetDownloadFile.aspx) 
revt-1 Revenue generated in the previous year by the University’s 
football program as reported by the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Equity in Athletics Database 
(http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/GetDownloadFile.aspx) 
 
University Characteristics: Game Performance 
 
wt-1 Number of wins by the University’s football program in the 
previous year. 
lt-1 Number of losses by the University’s football program in the 
previous year. 










lt Number of losses by the University’s football program in the 
current year. 
att Current year average attendance at each University’s home 
football games as reported to the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association 
attt-1 Previous year average attendance at each University’s home 
football games as reported to the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association 
percap Current year average attendance as a percentage of total stadium 
capacity 
 
University Characteristics: Recruiting Performance 
 
rank Ranking of current contract year by University’s recruiting class 
as ranked by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
avgstars Average stars of current contract year by University’s recruiting 
class as assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
points Total accumulated points of current contract year by University’s 
recruiting class as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
rankt-1 Ranking of last contract year by University’s recruiting class as 
ranked by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
avgstars t-1 Average stars of last contract year by University’s recruiting class 
as assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
points t-1 Total accumulated points of last contract year by University’s 
recruiting class as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
rank t-2 Ranking of two contract years ago by University’s recruiting class 
as ranked by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
avgstars t-2 Average stars of two contract years ago by University’s recruiting 
class as assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
points t-2 Total accumulated points two contract years ago by University’s 
recruiting class as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
rank t-3 Ranking of three contract years ago by University’s recruiting 









avgstars t-3 Average stars of three contract years ago by University’s 
recruiting class as assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
points t-3 Total accumulated points three contract years ago by University’s 
recruiting class as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma4rank Four year average ranking of University’s recruiting class as 
ranked by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma4avgstar Four year average stars of University’s recruiting class as 
assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma4points Four year total accumulated points of University’s recruiting class 
as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma3rank Three year average ranking of University’s recruiting class as 
ranked by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma3avgstar Three year average stars of University’s recruiting class as 
assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma3points Three year total accumulated points of University’s recruiting 
class as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma2rank Two year average ranking of University’s recruiting class as 
ranked by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma2avgstar Two year average stars of University’s recruiting class as 
assigned by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
ma2points Two year total accumulated points of University’s recruiting class 
as reported by Rivals (www.rivals.com) 
 
Contract Characteristics: General and Salary 
 
yr09 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2009, 0 if 
contract observation year is not 2009 
yr08 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2008, 0 if 
contract observation year is not 2008 
yr07 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2007, 0 if 
contract observation year is not 2007 
yr06 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2006, 0 if 









yr05 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2005, 0 if 
contract observation year is not 2005 
yr04 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2004, 0 if 
contract observation year is not 2004 
yr03 Dummy variable equals 1 if contract observation year is 2003, 0 if 
contract observation year is not 2003 
bgn Date in which current contract commenced 
end Date in which current contract expires 
term  This is the total length of the coach’s current contract 
termrmng This is the length of time left in the coaches contract 
basesalary Coach’s current year base salary paid by University  
othersalary Coach’s current year additional salary (i.e. Supplemental Pay, 
Longevity Bonus) 
bonus Signing Bonus 
oicamp Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach can receive outside income 
from the operation of a yearly football camp, and 0 if Coach 
cannot receive outside income from the operation of a yearly 
football camp 
oiendorse Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach can receive outside income 
from various endorsement opportunities, and 0 if Coach cannot 
receive outside income from various endorsement opportunities 
oieqshap Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach can receive outside income 
from Equipment, Shoes, and Apparel contracts, and 0 if Coach 
cannot receive outside income from Equipment, Shoes, and 
Apparel contracts 
oimedia Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach can receive outside income 
from various media sources (this does not refer to coaches radio 
and TV shows), and 0 if Coach cannot receive outside income 









annrep Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract indicates all outside 
income earned by Coach must be reported to the University 
annually 0 if not. 
supmkt Current year supplemental salary earned by coach for 
participation in various media marketing, endorsements, and 
public relations (usually not paid by University). 
suppanty Current year annuity supplemental salary paid to Coach (may be 
paid by University or by other organizations).  
di Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains stipulates 
an annuity payment into a deferred income account to be 
maintained by the university until an agreed upon date at which 
the balance is paid to the coach, 0 if Coach’s contract does not 
contains stipulates an annuity payment into a deferred income 
account to be maintained by the university 
dibgn The date the annual annuity payments made into the deferred 
income account begin 
diend The date the annual annuity payments made into the deferred 
income account end 
diyrs The number of years the annuity is paid into the deferred annuity 
account 
diannpay The dollar amount of the annual annuity payment deposited into 
the deferred income account. 
dibal The current year balance held in the deferred income account 
dideath Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
stipulating upon the coach’s death, the coach’s estate is eligible to 
receive the current balance held within the deferred income 
account, 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a clause 
stipulating upon the coach’s death, the coach’s estate is eligible to 










guarsalary Total Amount of Guaranteed Salary.  This is determined as the 
summation of Base Salary, Other Salary, Bonus, Supplemental 
Marketing Compensation, and Supplemental Annuity 
Compensation.   
maxbonus The greatest amount that can be received if team meets prescribed 
on-field performance goals (e.g. win totals, bowl games 
appearances, conference and/or national championships, Coach-
of-the-Year awards, etc.) and/or academic goals 
comp The summation of GuarSalary and MaxBonus, thus this would be 
the maximum available compensation Coach could receive within 
this current year 
guar The percentage of guaranteed salary in regards to the total 
maximum compensation.  
 
Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives 
 
dchamp Performance Incentive Bonus for winning the regular season 
Conference Division championship   
appcchmp Performance Incentive Bonus for Appearing in the Conference 
Championship Game. 
appbowl2 Performance Incentive Bonus for Appearing in a Tier 2 Post 
Season Bowl Game (Tier 2 Bowls determined by University). 
appbowl1 Performance Incentive Bonus for Appearing in a Tier 1 Post 
Season Bowl Game (Tier 1 Bowls determined by University). 
appbcs Performance Incentive Bonus for Appearing in a Bowl 
Championship Series Post Season Bowl Game. 
ppnatchmp Performance Incentive Bonus for Appearing in the National 
Championship Post Season Bowl Game. 










winbowl2 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning a Tier 2 Post Season 
Bowl Game (Tier 2 Bowls determined by University). 
winbowl1 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning a Tier 1 Post Season 
Bowl Game (Tier 1 Bowls determined by University). 
winbcs Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning a Bowl Championship 
Series Post Season Bowl Game. 
natchmp Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning the National 
Championship Post Season Bowl Game. 
win5 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 5 regular season. 
win6 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 6 regular season. 
win7 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 7 regular season. 
win8 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 8 regular season. 
win9 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 9 regular season. 
win10 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 10 regular season. 
win11 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 11 regular season. 
win12 Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning 12 regular season. 
natrank Performance Incentive Bonus for football program being 
nationally ranked 
confcoy Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning the Conference Coach 
of the Year Award 
natcoy Performance Incentive Bonus for Winning the National Coach of 
the Year Award 
stfbowl Bonus allocated to Coach to distribute to football staff when 
football program makes an appearance in a bowl game. 
acach Current year supplemental salary earned by Coach due to the 
academic achievements of football student athletes (usually paid 









perfother All Other Performance Incentives Bonuses paid to Coach in 
current contract year 
perq Total Number of Performance Incentives Bonuses paid to Coach 
in current contract year 
 
Contract Characteristics: Non-Performance Incentives 
 
auto1 Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach receives a late model 
automobile for both personal and business use paid for by 
University, 0 Coach does not receive a late model automobile for 
both personal and business use paid for by University. 
auto2 Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach receives a second late model 
automobile for use by a spouse paid for by University, 0 if Coach 
does not receive a second late model automobile for use by a 
spouse paid for by University 
cc Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach receives a Country Club 
membership paid by University for personal and business use of 
Coach and family, 0 if Coach does not receive a Country Club 
membership paid by University for personal and business use of 
Coach and family 
sptravel Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s spouse receives travel 
privileges for recruiting and away games, 0 if Coach’s spouse 
receives travel privileges for recruiting and away games 
suite Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach receives a suite at each home 
football game for use at his discretion either personal or business, 
0 if Coach receives a suite at each home football game for use at 
his discretion either personal or business 
tkts Number of additional season football tickets Coach receives for 
use at his discretion, either personal of business. 
othertkts Number of additional season tickets for other sports (Men’s and 
Women’s Basketball, Men’s Hockey, and All Sports) Coach 









bowltkts Number of additional bowl tickets Coach receives for use at his 
discretion, either personal of business. 
rettkts Number of additional season football tickets Coach receives for 
use after his retirement. 
nperfother Other Non-Performance Based Incentives Coach receives during 
current contract year. 
 
Contract Characteristics: Termination and Buyout Characteristics 
 
tcconfrlz Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to violation of conference rules and 
bylaws, 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a clause allowing 
the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s contract with 
just cause due to violation of conference rules and bylaws. 
tcncaarlz Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to violation of National Collegiate 
Athletic Association rules and bylaws, 0 if Coach’s contract does 
not contain a clause allowing the University, at its discretion to 
terminate Coach’s contract with just cause due to violation of 
National Collegiate Athletic Association rules and bylaws rules 
and bylaws. 
tcdeath Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to death of Coach, 0 if Coach’s 
contract does not contain a clause allowing the University, at its 
discretion to terminate Coach’s contract with just cause due to 









tccont Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to violation of any terms of Coach’s 
contract, 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a clause allowing 
the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s contract with 
just cause due to violation of any terms of Coach’s contract. 
tcuniv Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to violation of University rules and 
bylaws, 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a clause allowing 
the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s contract with 
just cause due to violation of University rules and bylaws. 
tcdi Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
stipulating upon the termination of Coach’s contract with just 
cause by the University, Coach is eligible to receive the current 
balance held within the deferred income account, 0 if Coach’s 
contract does not contain a clause stipulating upon the termination 
of Coach’s contract with just cause by the University, Coach is 
eligible to receive current balance held within the deferred income 
account. 
tccrim Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to criminal charges of moral 
turpitude, 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a clause allowing 
the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s contract with 
just cause due to criminal charges of moral turpitude. 
tcltdis Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
allowing the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s 
contract with just cause due to long term disability (usually 
defined as the inability to perform duties of head coach for six 
months), if Coach’s contract does not contain a clause allowing 
the University, at its discretion to terminate Coach’s contract with 









twccost Current Year Cost to the University for termination of Coach’s 
contract without just cause. 
mc Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a 
mitigation clause obligating Coach to actively seek other 
employment upon the termination without cause by the 
University, 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a mitigation 
clause obligating Coach to actively seek other employment upon 
the termination without cause by the University 
twcdi Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a clause 
stipulating upon the termination of Coach’s contract without just 
cause by the University, Coach is eligible to receive the current 
balance held within the deferred income account, 0 if Coach’s 
contract does not contain a clause stipulating upon the termination 
of Coach’s contract without just cause by the University, Coach is 
eligible to receive current balance held within the deferred income 
account. 
twcrsmt Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a 
reassignment clause allowing the University to reassign the coach 
to other duties through the remainder of his contract (in most 
cases the university continues to pay coach his guaranteed base 
salary, but coach is ineligible for all nonguaranteed salary or 
bonuses), 0 if Coach’s contract does not contain a reassignment 
clause allowing the University to reassign the coach to other 
duties through the remainder of his contract 
bo Dummy variable equals 1 if Coach’s contract contains a Buyout 
clause (option for Coach to cancel employment contract for other 
employment) 0 Coach’s contract does not contain a Buyout 
clause. 
bocost Current contract year Buyout exercise cost 
bodi Dummy variable equals 1 if upon exercise of Coach’s buyout 
option Coach is still eligible for cumulative Deferred Income, 0 if 
upon exercise of Coach’s buyout option Coach is not eligible for 




Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
The sample football programs consists of all public University football programs within the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Bowl Championship Division for which the 
university’s head football coach’s employment agreement is publically available for the years 
2003-2009.  The coach’s variables and the contract structure variables were collected from each 
university’s head football coach’s employment agreement and from other various sources.  
stadium capacity, coach’s win/loss records (UnivW, UnivL, UnivT, CrW, CrL, CrT, Wt, Lt, 
Wlag1, and Llag1) were collected from either the NCAA, or College Football Data Warehouse.  
The recruiting data was collected from Rivals.com.  The succession information (FVR, NFL, 
Head, PFVR, PNFL, and PHead) were collected from various sources such as Coaches Hot Seat, 
University Websites, and other news sources.  Average attendance was collected from the 
NCAA’s annual attendance report.  Endowment information was collected from the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers Annual Endowment Study.  Finally, 
football revenues were collected from the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics 
Database.  
Variable N   Mean    Median SD Min Max 
 
Coach Characteristics (Panel A) 
 
age  518 51.20 51.00 8.32 33.00 79.00 
racew 518 0.93 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 
raceb 518 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 
raceo 518 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
yrsuniv 518 5.53 4.00 5.14 1.00 34.00 
univw 518 40.65 26.00 47.05 1.00 316.00 
univl 518 27.61 23.50 19.50 0.00 97.00 
perunivwin 518 54.00 54.00 17.69 0.00 100.00 
yrscr 518 10.10 8.00 7.88 1.00 44.00 
hcage 518 41.10 41.00 6.40 26.00 61.00 
wcr 518 71.84 57.00 64.17 1.00 389.00 
lcr 518 47.46 40.00 33.30 0.00 160.00 
percrwin 518 55.36 58.00 15.73 0.00 100.00 
fvr 518 0.92 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
head 518 0.42 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
nfl 518 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
within 518 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 
University Characteristics (Panel B1) 
 
big_12   518 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 




Variable N   Mean    Median SD Min Max 
big_east   518 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 
big_10 518 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
cusa   518 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
mac 518 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
mwc 518 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 
pac_10 518 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 
sec 518 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
sunbelt 518 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
wac 518 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
pfvr 518 0.42 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
phead 518 0.25 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
pnfl 518 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
stcap 518 53,247 50,250 23,386 16,000 107,501 
endmntt 471 $920,066 $412,308 $1,832,649 $17,542 $16,171,184 
endmntt-1 467 $902,369 $404,674 $1,789,537 $17,542 $16,171,184 
revt 421 $17,908,753 $12,205,141 $16,824,606 $740,749 $87,583,986 
revt-1 513 $17,281,670 $11,931,887 $16,302,183 $670,647 $87,583,986 
 
University Characteristics: Game Performance (Panel B2) 
 
wt-1 518 6.56 7.00 2.89 0.00 14.00 
lt-1 518 5.77 6.00 2.39 0.00 12.00 
wt 518 6.56 7.00 2.86 0.00 14.00 
lt 518 5.85 6.00 2.36 0.00 12.00 
avgattt 515 45,118 41,209 26,730 5,016 111,025 
Avgattt-1 512 45,019 40,978 26,715 5,219 111,025 
percap 518 79.67 87.00 20.63 17.00 117.00 
 
University Characteristics: Recruiting Performance (Panel B3) 
 
rankt 507 57.86 59.00 33.60 1.00 120.00 
avgstarst 507 2.59 2.46 0.54 1.73 3.94 
pointst 507 717.24 406.00 722.40 39.00 2,959.00 
rankt-1 504 57.76 59.00 33.57 1.00 120.00 
avgstarst-1 504 2.57 2.42 0.54 1.00 4.09 
pointst-1 504 730.07 490.50 711.89 25.00 2,959.00 
rankt-2 473 58.13 59.00 33.90 1.00 118.00 
avgstarst-2 473 2.54 2.36 0.55 0.70 4.09 
pointst-2 473 753.51 626.00 699.90 25.00 2,959.00 
rankt-3 426 57.73 58.00 33.79 1.00 118.00 




Variable N   Mean    Median SD Min Max 
pointst-3 426 804.35 714.00 689.76 25.00 2,901.00 
ma4rank 518 53.48 49.00 31.63 0.00 110.00 
ma4AvgStar 518 2.36 2.23 0.71 0.00 3.89 
ma4Points 518 690.60 510.50 618.27 0.00 2,619.00 
ma3Rank 518 55.31 51.00 34.62 0.00 115.00 
ma3AvgStar 518 2.45 2.34 0.67 0.00 0.67 
ma3Points 518 700.13 507.00 649.09 0.00 2,820.00 
ma2Rank 518 29.69 30.00 17.05 0.00 61.00 
ma2AvgStar 518 2.52 2.42 0.65 0.00 3.89 
ma2Points 518 706.43 459.50 682.76 0.00 2930.00 
 
Contract Characteristics: General and Salary (Panel C1) 
 
yr09 518 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 
yr08 518 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
yr07 518 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
yr06 518 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
yr05 518 0.13 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
yr04 518 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
yr03 518 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
term  518 6.51 6.00 2.22 1.00 14.10 
termrmng 518 4.70 4.90 1.68 1.00 10.50 
basesalary 518 $285,717 $228,300 $226,534 $75,000 $1,900,000 
othersalary 115 $292,136 $120,000 $395,599 $4,800 $1,800,000 
bonus 31 $283,861 $200,000 $269,399 $25,000 $1,000,000 
oicamp 513 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
oiendorse 513 0.78 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
oieqshap 513 0.67 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
oimedia 513 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
annrep 513 0.99 1.00 0.08 1.00 1.00 
supmkt 422 $661,231 $505,000 $629,247 $1,000 $3,275,000 
suppanty 25 $128,840 $125,000 $117,335 $16,000 $300,000 
di 518 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
diyrs 137 5.41 5.00 2.18 0.00 11.00 
diannpay 131 $163,872 $100,000 $191,351 $10,200 $750,000 
dibal 137 $359,205 $200,000 $444,044 $10,200 $3,000,000 
dideath 518 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
guarsalary 518 $912,466 $697,500 $762,882 $75,000 $3,780,0000 
maxbonus 518 $350,936 $280,000 $328,751 $0 $1,722,250 
totalmax 518 $1,263,402 $1,000,000 $978,148 $90,000 $4,630,000 




Variable N   Mean    Median SD Min Max 
 
Contract Characteristics: Performance Based Incentives (Panel C2) 
 
dchamp 136 $28,384 $21,250 $27,514 $2,000 $100,000 
appcchmp 103 $49,376 $37,500 $35,014 $5,000 $150,000 
appbowl2 434 $28,286 $25,000 $21,170 $2,500 $150,000 
appbowl1 121 $30,697 $25,000 $17,673 $7,500 $75,000 
appbcs 333 $58,966 $50,000 $47,961 $4,894 $340,000 
appnatchmp 119 $72,297 $50,000 $53,659 $20,000 $250,000 
cchmp 379 $50,558 $25,000 $61,573 $2,500 $382,884 
winbowl2 64 $15,562 $10,000 $13,368 $2,500 $50,000 
winbowl1 5 $25,000 $25,000 $0.00 $25,000 $25,000 
bcswin 28 $67,589 $50,000 $62,303 $7,500 $250,000 
natchmp 190 $156,873 $150,000 $99,934 $25,000 $500,000 
win5 1 $2,000 $2,000 $0.00 $2,000 $2,000 
win6 24 $16,760 $10,000 $15,404 $5,000 $50,000 
win7 51 $20,343 $10,000 $22,237 $2,500 $100,000 
win8 88 $15,999 $10,000 $19,082 $2,500 $100,000 
win9 97 $22,340 $10,000 $27,372 $2,500 $100,000 
win10 102 $28,304 $10,000 $42,644 $2,500 $200,000 
win11 84 $33,565 $10,000 $76,615 $2,500 $500,000 
win12 63 $51,897 $15,000 $110,812 $2,500 $600,000 
natrank 198 $69,083 $50,000 $88,385 $4,350 $450,000 
confcoy 244 $20,036 $20,000 $16,094 $2,000 $133,333 
natcoy 193 $39,241 $50,000 $23,140 $5,000 $150,000 
stfbowl 4 $40,000 $40,000 $0.00 $40,000 $40,000 
acach 312 $53,461 $27,353 $59,031 $2,500 $275,000 
perfother 211 $113,633 $31,000 $256,519 $1,500 $1,500,000 
 
Contract Characteristics: Non-Performance Based Incentives (Panel C3) 
 
auto1 518 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
auto2 518 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
cc 518 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
sptravel 518 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
suite 518 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
tkts 257 18.44 20.00 9.00 6.00 50.00 
othertkts 174 6.24 4.00 4.73 4.00 30.00 
bowltkts 70 22.66 16.00 38.24 6.00 200.00 





Variable N   Mean    Median SD Min Max 
Contract Characteristics: Termination and Buyout Characteristics (Panel C4) 
 
tcconfrlz 518 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
tcncaarlz 518 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
tcdeath 518 0.83 1.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 
tccont 518 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
tcuniv 518 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
tcdi 518 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 
tccrim 518 0.99 1.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 
tcltdis 518 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
twccost 509 $2,920,854 $1,500,000 $3,706,742 $0.00 $28,000,000 
mc 518 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
twcdi 518 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 
twcrsmt 518 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
bo 518 0.87 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
bocost 409 $1,037,388 $500,000 $1,695,115 $0.00 $13,440,000 





Table 3.  Univariate Test Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the univariate tests.  The sample football programs where split into 
two subgroups, Low Total Maximum Compensation and High Total Maximum Compensation 
based on whether they fell above or below the median maximum compensation of $1,000,000.  
The t-statistic provides a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the mean [median] values do 
not differ.  The Wilcoxon sign-rank Z-statistic provides a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis 
that the median values do not differ.  Significance levels are as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
 
Coach Characteristics (Panel A) 
 
age  50.77 51.63 -1.1800 1.7356* 
 [50.00] [52.00] 0.2398 0.0826 
racew 0.93 0.92 0.7400 -0.7378 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.4608 0.4606 
raceb 0.05 0.05 -0.0400 0.0396 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.9678 0.9684 
raceo 0.01 0.03 -1.3000 1.2995 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.1936 0.1938 
yrsuniv 4.90 6.18 -2.8700*** 2.6904*** 
 [4.00] [5.00] 0.0043 0.0071 
univw 32.17 48.95 -4.1200*** 4.5826*** 
 [20.00] [34.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
univl 27.95 27.27 0.40 -0.9281 
 [24.00] [23.00] 0.6928 0.3533 
perunivwin 46.97 58.59 -7.9100*** 6.8933*** 
 [48.00] [58.00] <.0001 <0.0001 
yrscr 8.51 11.71 -4.72*** 5.1183*** 
 [6.00] [11.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
hcage 42.10 40.04 3.70*** -3.5986*** 
 [42.00] [39.00] <0.0002 <0.0002 
wcr 54.31 89.64 -6.5100*** 6.7629*** 
 [39.00] [73.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
lcr 45.03 49.92 -1.6700* 2.6228*** 
 [35.00] [46.00] 0.0950 0.0087 
percrwin 49.36 61.44 -9.4600*** 8.7458*** 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
fvr 0.91 0.94 -1.2700 1.2641 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.2063 0.2062 
head 0.35 0.51 -3.7500*** 3.6998*** 
 [0.00] [1.00] 0.0002 0.0002 
nfl 0.13 0.22 -2.7500*** 2.7337*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0061 0.0063 
within 0.16 0.16 0.0500 -0.0448 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.9639 0.9643 
 
University Characteristics (Panel B) 
 
big_12   0.03 0.21 -6.7400*** 6.4644*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.001 <0.001 
acc   0.03 0.15 -4.9000*** 4.7925*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
big_east   0.04 0.10 -2.6900*** 2.6699*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0075 0.0076 
big_10 0.04 0.16 -4.83*** 4.7324*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
cusa   0.12 0.04 3.5200*** 1.3683*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0005 <.0001 
mac 0.24 0.00 8.9300*** -3.4852*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 0.0005 
mwc 0.09 0.04 2.2300** -8.3191*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0259 <0.0001 
pac_10 0.04 0.11 -2.9700*** 2.9456*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0031 0.0032 
sec 0.04 0.15 -4.1700*** 4.1060*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
sunbelt 0.17 0.00 7.30*** -6.9587*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
wac 0.14 0.04 3.93*** -3.8794*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 0.0001 
pfvr 0.43 0.40 0.6500 -0.6513 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
phead 0.25 0.26 -0.3000 0.3038 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.7613 0.7613 
pnfl 0.07 0.16 -3.1100*** 3.0807*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0020 0.0021 
stcap 38,406 68,319 -18.9300*** 15.1486*** 
 [31,218 [68,349] <0.0001 <0.0001 
endmntt $310,489 $1,440,847 -7.0100*** -12.2687*** 
 [$175,797] [$677,425] <0.0001 <0.0001 
endmntt-1 $290,531 $1,424,374 -7.1900*** -12.5191*** 
 [$170,830] [$671,469] <0.0001 <0.0001 
revt $8,125,256 $28,617,058 -15.7200*** 14.0539*** 
 [$5,220,916] [$24,286,331] <0.0001 <0.0001 
revt-1 $7,337,926 $27,186,723 -17.3700*** -15.8276*** 
 [$4,870,639] [$22,830,766] <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
University Characteristics: Game Performance (Panel B2) 
 
wt-1 5.54 7.60 -8.7000*** 8.1556*** 
 [5.00] [8.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
lt-1 6.58 4.95 8.2500*** -7.7137*** 
 [6.00] [5.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
wt 5.52 7.61 -8.9300*** 8.2642*** 
 [5.00] [8.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
lt 6.67 5.00 8.6100*** -7.7498*** 
 [7.00] [5.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
avgattt 26,983 63,323 -21.0300*** 15.8993*** 
 [20,114 [60,232] <0.0001 <0.0001 
avgattt-1 26,947 62,950 -20.6300*** -15.7515*** 
 [20,479] [60,377] <0.0001 <0.0001 
percap 67.72 91.67 -16.1700*** 13.8381*** 








 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
 
University Characteristics: Recruiting Performance (Panel B3) 
 
rankt 79.69 36.63 18.78*** 14.3000*** 
 [85.50] [34.00] <.0001 <.0001 
avgstarst 2.23 2.95 -20.1300*** -15.6153*** 
 [2.13] [2.96] <0.0001 <0.0001 
pointst 294.35 1,129 -15.9100*** -14.3889*** 
 [107.50] [1,110] <0.0001 <0.0001 
rankt-1 79.99 36.40 19.1500*** 14.4599*** 
 [86.00] [33.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
avgstarst-1 2.21 2.91 -19.1700*** -15.3567*** 
 [2.11] [2.92] <0.0001 <0.0001 
pointst-1 327.47 1,117 -14.9500*** -13.6567*** 
 [112.00] [1,107] <0.0001 <0.0001 
rankt-2 81.13 36.73 18.8300*** 14.1127*** 
 [87.00] [33.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
avgstarst-2 2.18 2.87 -17.6900*** -14.6489*** 
 [2.08] [2.82] <0.0001 <0.0001 
pointst-2 371.31 1,109 -13.4700*** -12.3327*** 
 [122.00] [1,100] <0.0001 <0.0001 
rankt-2 81.36 37.01 17.8800*** 13.4170*** 
 [87.00] [33.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
avgstarst-2 2.17 2.85 -16.0700*** -13.7113*** 
 [2.08] [2.81] <0.0001 <0.0001 
pointst-2 440.48 1,123 -11.7200*** -10.6753*** 
 [176.00] [1,122] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma4rank 71.37 35.31 15.7800*** -12.8016*** 
 [82.00] [32.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma4avgstar 1.94 2.78 -16.6200*** 14.7776*** 
 [2.06] [2.81] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma4points 313.15 1,074 -17.7500*** 14.6576*** 
 [236.00] [1,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma3rank 74.30 36.02 16.7000*** -13.2894*** 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
ma3avgstar  2.04 2.87 -17.9200*** 15.8536*** 
 [2.08] [2.86] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma3points 305.41 1,101 -17.6400*** 14.7308*** 
 [157.00] [1,043] <.00001 <0.0001 
ma2rank 39.40 19.80 15.9800*** -12.9978*** 
 [43.00] [18.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma2avgstar 2.11 2.93 -18.4500*** 16.1958*** 
 [2.10] [2.91] <0.0001 <0.0001 
ma2points 296.17 1,123 -17.3100*** 14.8057*** 
 [117.00] [1,055] <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Contract Characteristics: General and Salary (Panel C) 
 
yr09 0.15 0.22 -2.1400** 2.1324** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0328 0.0330 
yr08 0.15 0.21 -1.5700 1.5685 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.1167 0.1168 
yr07 0.17 0.18 -0.4300 0.4267 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.6697 0.6696 
yr06 0.19 0.16 0.9600 -0.9567 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.3390 0.3387 
yr05 0.16 0.12 1.4500 -1.4516 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.1466 0.1466 
yr04 0.11 0.07 1.6300 -1.6250 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.1041 0.1042 
yr03 0.07 0.05 1.080 -1.0833 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.2788 0.2787 
term  5.95 7.08 -6.0000*** 7.3532*** 
 [5.10] [7.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
termrmng  4.11 5.29 -8.5700*** 7.8709*** 
 [4.294] [5.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
basesalary $211,537 $361,051 -7.9500*** 9.3346*** 
 [$195,000] [$270,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
othersalary $61,155 $415,326 -5.0400*** -6.7568*** 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
bonus $75,020 $324,022 -1.9800* -2.9969*** 
 [$70,208] [$200,000] 0.0569 0.0027 
oicamp 0.96 0.84 4.5300*** 4.4464*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
oiendorse 0.88 0.68 5.7900*** 5.6170*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
oieqshap 0.77 0.56 5.1500*** 5.0287*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
oimedia 0.83 0.59 6.1000*** 5.8982*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
annrep 0.99 1.00 -1.7400* -1.7366* 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.0821 0.0825 
supmkt $180,682 $1,062,386 -20.0100*** -16.2867*** 
 [$92,250] [$936,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
suppanty . $128,840 . . 
 . [$125,000] . . 
di 0.22 0.32 -2.3800** 2.3665** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0178 0.0180 
diyrs 5.96 5.31 0.6100 -0.1167 
 [5.00] [5.00] 0.5426 0.9071 
diannpay 58,855 $238,007 -6.5000*** -6.0774*** 
 [$50,000] [$200,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
dibal 178,218 $500,804 -4.6000*** -5.4024*** 
 [$100,000] [$352,189] <0.0001 <0.0001 
dideath 0.15 0.28 -3.5200*** 3.4820*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0005 0.0005 
guarsalary $355,262 $1,478,342 -24.7500*** 18.5874*** 
 [$287,800] [$1,300,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
maxbonus $126,160 $579,211 -21.6400*** 17.4496*** 
 [$90,000] [$523,750] <0.0001 <0.0001 
totalmax $481,422 $2,057,553 -30.9800*** 19.6908*** 
 [$439,253] [$1,925,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
perguar 76.61 70.65 4.2600*** -4.1664*** 





 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
Contract Characteristics: Performance Incentives (Panel C2) 
 
dchamp $7,768 $49,573 -10.9400*** 8.4879*** 
 [$10,000] [$50000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
appcchmp $15,405 $65,390 -9.0600*** -7.6617*** 
 [$13,542] [$63,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
appbowl2 $17,402 $37,458 -11.1100*** -11.6963*** 
 [$16,667] [$25,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
appbowl1 $26,218 $31,922 -1.4700 -2.6998*** 
 [$21,992] [$25,000] 0.1455 0.0069 
appbcs $52,368 $63,034 -1.8200* -1.6605* 
 [$50,000] [$50,000] 0.0702 0.0968 
appnatchmp $53,684 $75,833 -1.6600* -1.3378 
 [$50,000] [$50,000] 0.0993 0.1810 
cchmp $18,710 $74,080 -9.6500*** -11.7194*** 
 [$16,666] [$50,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
winbowl2 $10,595 $37,083 -9.8000*** 4.6511*** 
 [$10,000] [$50,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
winbowl1 . $25,000 . . 
 . [$25,000] . . 
bcswin $35,278 $82,895 -1.9900* -2.5060** 
 [$15,000] [$75,000] 0.0573 0.0122 
natchmp $82,146 $172,580 -5.02*** -6.0331*** 
 [$75,000] [$150,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
win5 $2,000 . . . 
 [$2,000] [.] . . 
win6 $10,185 $23,333 -2.2700*** -2.1174*** 
 [$8,334] [$10,000] 0.0332 0.0342 
win7 $9,205 $28,793 -3.4400*** -3.5478*** 
 [$5,000] [$20,000] 0.0012 0.0004 
win8 $7,999 $22,080 -3.6700*** -4.5337*** 
 [$6,750] [$12,500] 0.0004 <0.0001 
win9 $7,061 $30,219 -4.5300*** -5.0049*** 
 [$6,000] [$20,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
win10 $7,722 $39,530 -3.8400*** -4.8712*** 
 [$6,000] [$25,000] 0.0002 <0.0001 
win11 $8,157 $51,714 -2.6600*** -3.7456*** 
 [$6,000] [$15,000] 0.0094 0.0002 
win12 $8,232 $86,829 -2.9700*** -4.7131*** 
 [$5,500] [$35,000] 0.0043 <0.0001 
natrank $25,971 $108,847 -7.4500*** -8.8266*** 
 [$15,000] [$60,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
confcoy $11,812 $47,153 -7.5700*** -8.9732*** 
 [$10,000] [$50,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
natcoy $23,661 $47,153 -7.5800*** -7.8012*** 
 [$20,000] [$50,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
stfbowl . $40,000 . . 
 . [$40,000] . . 
acach $20,782 $76,194 -9.1800*** -10.7157*** 
 [$19,375] [$50,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
perfother $46,561 $202,078 -4.5600*** 6.8069*** 
 [$25,000] [$81,750] <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Contract Characteristics: Non-Performance Incentives (Panel C3) 
 
auto1 0.74 0.86 -3.2300*** 3.1990*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.0013 0.0014 
auto2 0.19 0.63 -11.440*** 10.2272*** 
 [0.00] [1.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
cc 0.50 0.62 -2.7800*** 2.7641*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.0056 0.0057 
sptravel 0.17 0.24 -2.1700* 2.1627** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0763 0.0306 
suite 0.18 0.34 -4.0600*** 4.0038*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
tkts 18.39 18.47 -0.0700 1.5895 
 [20.00] [20.00] 0.9436 0.1119 
othertkts 5.45 6.989 -2.1700** -1.6555* 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
bowltkts 14.18 26.54 -1.2600 -1.0908 
 [16.00] [20.00] 0.2117 0.2754 
perq 2.70 4.15 -7.3000*** 6.9145*** 
 [2.00] [4.00] <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Contract Characteristics: Termination and Buyout Characteristics (Panel C4) 
 
tcconfrlz 1.00 1.00 . 0.0000 
 [1.00] [1.00] . 1.0000 
tcncaarlz 1.00 1.00 . 0.0000 
 [1.00] [1.00] . 1.0000 
tcdeath 0.98 0.99 -0.9900 0.9890 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.3225 0.3227 
tccont 1.00 1.00 . 0.0000 
 [1.00] [1.00] . 1.0000 
tcuniv 1.00 1.00 . 0.0000 
 [1.00] [1.00] . 1.0000 
tcdi 0.02 0.04 -1.5500 1.5449* 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.1222 0.0615 
tccrim 1.00 0.97 2.6900*** -2.6753*** 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.0073 0.0075 
tcltdis 0.82 0.89 -2.3500** 2.3434** 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.0189 0.0191 
twccost $1,005,557 $4,813,707 -13.5000*** -15.3135*** 
 [$800,000] [$3,500,000] <0.0001 <0.0001 
mc 0.43 0.36 1.5700 -1.5672 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.1171 0.1171 
twcdi 0.14 0.22 -2.3700** 2.3602** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0181 0.0183 
twcrsmt 0.21 0.14 2.2200** -2.2151** 
 [0.00] [0.00] 0.0266 0.0268 
bo 0.88 0.85 0.8500 0.8473 
 [1.00] [1.00] 0.3971 0.3968 
bocost $441,705 $1,635,991 -7.6000*** 9.3080*** 




 Low  High  Wilcoxon 
 Total Max Total Max  Sign rank 
 Mean Mean t-statistic Z-statistic 
Variable [Median]  [Median]  (p-value) (p-value) 
bodi 0.03 0.01 1.6700* 1.6601* 






Table 4.1.  Estimates of the Relation Between Maximum Compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents both random effects and fixed effects, results for the estimation of the relation between 
maximum compensation (comp) and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and 
Contract Characteristics.  The OLS results are estimated using the equations below.  
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2reci,t +  β4careeri,t +β5perwini,t +             (1.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2reci,t-1 +  β4careeri,t +β5perwini,t +                     (1.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
413 413 504 504 
Adj R
2
 0.5588 0.4392 0.5684 0.5320 
F-statistic  -- 8.90*** -- 13.89*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 242.32*** -- 315.73*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.0677 Random Effects p> chi
2 





Table 4.2.  Estimates of the Relation Between Maximum Compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents both random effects and fixed effects, results for the estimation of the relation between 
maximum compensation (comp) and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and 
Contract Characteristics.  The OLS results are estimated using the equations below.  
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3reci,t + β4careeri,t + β5perwini,t +   (2.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3reci,t-1 + β4careeri,t + β5perwini,t +           (2.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 







































































































Current Coach:  Previous 


























Current Coach:  Previous 
































Previous Coach:  Left for 






















Number of firm-year 
observations 
460 460 453 453 
Adj R
2
 0.5247 0.4878 0.5313 0.5078 
F-statistic  -- 3.08*** -- 6.59*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 191.70*** -- 220.39*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.3645 Random Effects p> chi
2 





Table 4.3.  Estimates of the Relation Between Maximum Compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents both random effects and fixed effects, results for the estimation of the relation between 
maximum compensation (comp) and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and 
Contract Characteristics.  The OLS results are estimated using the equations below.  
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2careeri,t + β3perwini,t + (3.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2careeri,t + β3perwini,t + (3.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
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Previous Coach:  Fired 










Previous Coach:  Left 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
421 421 513 513 
Adj R
2
 0.5564 0.4425 0.5752 0.5525 
F-statistic  -- 9.92*** -- 15.09*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 240.47*** -- 317.49*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.0523 Random Effects p> chi
2 
= 0.3165 Random Effects 





Table 4.4.  Estimates of the Relation Between Maximum Compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents both random effects and fixed effects, results for the estimation of the relation between 
maximum compensation (comp) and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and 
Contract Characteristics.  The OLS results are estimated using the equations below.  
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3careeri,t + β4perwini,t +                  (4.1) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 compi,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3careeri,t + β4perwini,t +                  (4.2) 
βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
468 468 461 461 
Adj R
2
 0.5282 0.5312 0.5399 0.5170 
F-statistic  -- 5.21*** -- 7.34*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 188.24*** -- 226.79*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.2325 Random Effects p> chi
2 





Table 5.1.  Estimates of the Relation Between Guaranteed compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents OLS, results for the estimation of the relation between guaranteed compensation (guar) 
and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics.  The OLS 
results are estimated using Equation (1)  
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2reci,t + β3hcagei,t+ β4univtenurei,t + β5perwini,t  (5.1) 
+ β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2reci,t-1 + β3hcagei,t + β4univtenurei,t + β5perwini,t  (5.2) 
+ β6wini,t-1  + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
errors are reported in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates (robust standard errors are reported for 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
413 413 504 504 
Adj R
2
 0.0659 0.0585 0.0848 0.0648 
F-statistic  3.70*** -- 4.43*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 42.36*** -- 60.69*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.0846 Random Effects p> chi
2 





Table 5.2.  Estimates of the Relation Between Guaranteed compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents OLS, results for the estimation of the relation between guaranteed compensation (guar) 
and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics.  The OLS 
results are estimated using Equation (1)  
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3reci,t + β4hcagei,t + β4univtenurei,t + β5perwini,t  (6.1) 
+ β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3reci,t-1 + β4hcagei,t + β4univtenurei,t + β5perwini,t  (6.2) 
+ β6wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
errors are reported in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates (robust standard errors are reported for 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
460 460 453 453 
Adj R
2
 0.1025 0.0914 0.0978 0.0806 
F-statistic -- 4.51*** -- 5.10*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 63.62*** -- 65.75*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.2838 Random Effects p> chi
2 





Table 5.3.  Estimates of the Relation Between Guaranteed compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents OLS, results for the estimation of the relation between guaranteed compensation (guar) 
and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics.  The OLS 
results are estimated using Equation (1)  
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t + β2compi,t+ β3careertenurei,t + β4univtenurei,t + β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1  (7.1) 
+βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1revi,t-1 + β2compi,t+ β3careertenurei,t + β4univtenurei,t + β5perwini,t + β6wini,t-1  (7.2) 
+ βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
errors are reported in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates (robust standard errors are reported for 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
421 421 513 513 
Adj R
2
 0.0650 0.0381 0.0812 0.0572 
F-statistic -- 4.01*** -- 4.02*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 43.58*** -- 54.15*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.1044 Random Effects p> chi
2 





Table 5.4.  Estimates of the Relation Between Guaranteed compensation, University Characteristics, 
Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics. 
 
This table presents OLS, results for the estimation of the relation between guaranteed compensation (guar) 
and University Characteristics, Head Coaches Characteristics, and Contract Characteristics.  The OLS 
results are estimated using Equation (1)  
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t + β2atti,t + β3compi,t+ β4careertenurei,t + β5univtenurei,t + β6perwini,t  (8.1) 
+ β7wini,t-1+ βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
 guari,t =  β0 + β1endowi,t-1 + β2atti,t-1 + β3compi,t+ β4careertenurei,t + β5univtenurei,t + β6perwini,t  (8.2) 
+ β7wini,t-1 + βm X1i,1+ βn X2i,t + βpX3i,t +βqΧ4i,t+ βrX5i,t + βsX6i,t + βuX7i,t +ei,t, 
 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The standard 
errors are reported in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates (robust standard errors are reported for 
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Number of firm-year 
observations 
468 468 461 461 
Adj R
2
 0.1077 0.0959 0.0805 0.0805 
F-statistic -- 4.69*** -- 4.70*** 
Wald (chi
2
) 63.77*** -- 61.68*** -- 
Hausman Test p> chi
2 
= 0.4026 Random Effects p> chi
2 






Table 6.  Summary of Multivariate Test Results 
      
This table presents a summary of multivariate test results from Models 1.1 through 8.2.  Models finding support for the given hypothesis are indicated by an "X" followed by 
an indication of the supporting variables.  Career tenure is indicated by "C", University tenure is indicated by "U", Revenue variables are indicated by "$", Recruiting is 
indicated by "R", winning performance is indicated by "W", attendance is indicated by "A", and endowment is indicated by "E".  Models failing to find support for the given 
hypothesis are indicated by an "O".   
                  
 
Hypothesis I: Hypothesis II: Hypothesis III: Hypothesis IV: Hypothesis V: Hypothesis VI: Hypothesis VII: Hypothesis VIII: 
 
Maximum Guarenteed  Maximum Guarenteed  Maximum Guarenteed  Maximum Maximum 
 
Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation 
 
vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. 
  Tenure Tenure Performance Performance Size Size     
Model 1.1 X (C) -- X ($,W) -- X F11($) -- O O 
Model 1.2 O -- X ($,R,W) -- X ($) -- O O 
Model 2.1 X (C) -- X (A) -- O -- O O 
Model 2.2 X (C) -- X (A,W) -- X (E) -- O O 
Model 3.1 X (C) -- X ($,W) -- X ($) -- O O 
Model 3.2 X (C) -- X ($,W) -- X ($) -- O O 
Model 4.1 X (C) -- X (A) -- O -- O O 
Model 4.2 X (C) -- X (A,W) -- X (E) -- O O 
Model 5.1 -- X (U) -- X (W) -- O -- -- 
Model 5.2 -- X (U) -- X (R,W) -- O -- -- 
Model 6.1 -- X (U) -- X (W) -- O -- -- 
Model 6.2 -- X (U) -- X (W) -- O -- -- 
Model 7.1 -- X (U) -- X (W) -- O -- -- 
Model 7.2 -- X (U) -- X (W) -- O -- -- 
Model 8.1 -- X (U) -- X (W) -- O -- -- 




Table 7.   Cross Correlation Matrix 
 
Age yrsuniv perunivwin yrscr percrwin wlag1 fvr head nfl within pfvr phead 
age 1.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . 
yrsuniv 0.5294 1.0000 . . . . . . . . . . 
perunivwin 0.1847 0.3738 1.0000 . . . . . . . . . 
yrscr 0.6916 0.6460 0.2632 1.0000 . . . . . . . . 
percrwin 0.2436 0.2907 0.7963 0.3709 1.0000 . . . . . . . 
wlag1 0.0409 0.2245 0.6343 0.1302 0.5265 1.0000 . . . . . . 
fvr -0.2510 0.0991 0.1652 -0.1510 0.0069 0.1432 1.0000 . . . . . 
head 0.3339 0.0480 0.1003 0.4919 0.2851 0.0467 -0.1525 1.0000 . . . . 
nfl 0.0930 -0.0804 -0.1057 0.0047 -0.0725 -0.0564 -0.2383 0.0437 1.0000 . . . 
within -0.0212 0.0271 0.2132 -0.1422 0.1828 0.1364 0.1062 -0.3065 -0.1801 1.0000 . . 
pfvr 0.0003 -0.1366 0.0695 -0.0600 0.0386 0.0961 -0.0035 -0.0778 -0.0533 0.1921 1.0000 . 
phead -0.0394 0.0089 0.2198 -0.0904 0.1098 0.1574 0.0070 -0.1592 -0.0129 0.2966 0.3185 1.0000 
pnfl 0.0072 -0.1295 0.0069 0.0106 0.0370 0.0574 -0.0331 0.1382 -0.0884 -0.1320 -0.0404 -0.0330 
avgatt 0.1045 0.1988 0.4451 0.2622 0.4367 0.4337 -0.0006 0.2804 0.1250 -0.0482 -0.0786 0.0026 
avgattlag1 0.1186 0.2047 0.4328 0.2620 0.4307 0.4323 -0.0094 0.2862 0.1189 -0.0339 -0.0587 0.0116 
points 0.0975 0.2030 0.4281 0.2338 0.4212 0.4018 0.0227 0.2955 0.0885 -0.0988 -0.0934 0.0687 
pointslag1 0.1022 0.2178 0.4383 0.2323 0.4206 0.3813 0.0601 0.2794 0.0443 -0.0716 -0.0812 0.0507 
endow 0.0943 0.0654 0.2042 0.2096 0.1327 0.2137 0.0141 0.1989 0.0293 -0.0333 -0.1128 -0.1247 
endowlag1 0.0860 0.0593 0.1841 0.2081 0.1266 0.2142 0.0175 0.2079 0.0324 -0.0460 -0.1061 -0.1284 
rev 0.0073 0.0685 0.3957 0.2007 0.3670 0.3883 -0.0257 0.3189 0.1006 -0.0839 -0.0520 -0.0357 
revlag1 0.0168 0.0756 0.3861 0.2048 0.3681 0.4050 -0.0193 0.3292 0.0875 -0.0771 -0.0541 -0.0542 
totalmax 0.1097 0.2024 0.3686 0.2547 0.3449 0.3827 0.0153 0.1970 0.1248 -0.1161 0.0026 -0.0445 
perguar 0.1478 0.2915 0.1352 0.2411 0.1597 0.1040 -0.0052 0.1348 -0.0026 -0.1477 -0.0899 -0.0242 





 pnfl avgatt avgattlag1 points pointslag1 endow endowlag1 rev revlag1 totalmax perguar hcage 
age . . . . . . . . . . . . 
yrsuniv . . . . . . . . . . . . 
perunivwin . . . . . . . . . . . . 
yrscr . . . . . . . . . . . . 
percrwin . . . . . . . . . . . . 
wlag1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
fvr . . . . . . . . . . . . 
head . . . . . . . . . . . . 
nfl . . . . . . . . . . . . 
within . . . . . . . . . . . . 
pfvr . . . . . . . . . . . . 
phead . . . . . . . . . . . . 
pnfl 1.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . 
avgatt 0.2271 1.0000 . . . . . . . . . . 
avgattlag1 0.2218 0.9840 1.0000 . . . . . . . . . 
points 0.1680 0.8458 0.8406 1.0000 . . . . . . . . 
pointslag1 0.1692 0.8290 0.8149 0.8024 1.0000 . . . . . . . 
endow -0.0023 0.4223 0.4138 0.3838 0.3762 1.0000 . . . . . . 
endowlag1 -0.0019 0.4304 0.4240 0.3938 0.3788 0.9699 1.0000 . . . . . 
rev 0.2053 0.8637 0.8588 0.7924 0.7594 0.4966 0.5132 1.0000 . . . . 
revlag1 0.2149 0.8564 0.8627 0.7807 0.7588 0.4863 0.5109 0.9510 1.0000 . . . 
totalmax 0.1625 0.6971 0.7036 0.6433 0.6186 0.3950 0.4206 0.7241 0.7230 1.0000 . . 
perguar 0.0324 0.1644 0.1568 0.1521 0.1448 0.1140 0.1094 0.1175 0.1180 -0.0694 1.0000 . 
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